IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/prs/rvofce/ofce_0751-6614_1997_num_61_1_1454.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

L'épidémie de crises bancaires dans les pays de l'OCDE

Author

Listed:
  • Thomas Lambert
  • Jacques Le Cacheux
  • Audrey Mahuet

Abstract

[eng] Over the past fifteen years, the banking systems of industrialized countries have had quite contrasted performances. Whereas Germany has been sheltered from trouble, the US, France, the UK Japan and Scandinavian countries have all been affected by banking crises, the depth and precise characteristics of which have however been diverse. To get rid of their problems, Scandinavian countries have had to inject such iarge amounts of funds (up to 15% of GDP in the case of Finland) that their public finances have been durably deteriorated. In the US, difficulties in banking have reached a degree unprecedented since the Great Depression of the 1930s: about 1500 commercial banks and 1200 Saving & Loans Insitutions have failed between 1984 and 1995. In Japan, the total amount of non-performing assets held by banks is currently estimated at about US$ 600 billions. In France, the critical situations of the Crédit Lyonnais, the Comptoir des Entrepreneurs or the Crédit Foncier are well known. Finally, the UK has lived through some highly publicized failures such as those of the BCCI and Barings. How to account for the seemingly increasing difficulties facing traditional banking and for the apparent diversity of national situations? Three factors may be looked at: the degree of concentration of national banking systems, the magnitude and speed of deregulation and the roles of banks in the financing of national economic activity. Each of these elements differs from one country to the other and contributes to the uniqueness of each national banking system. Hence, the problem arising in the European Union concerning the prevention and treatment of banking crises: given the diversity of national banking systems and of the national institutional in charge of their supervision and control, the stability of the European banking and financial sector is not guaranteed in the absence of a central authority. [fre] Au cours des quinze dernières années, les systèmes bancaires des grands pays industrialisés ont connu des évolutions contrastées. Si l'Allemagne a su demeurer à l'abri des difficultés, les Etats-Unis, la France, le Royaume-Uni, le Japon et les pays Scandinaves ont tous été affectés par des crises dont l'ampleur et les modalités ont cependantété trèsdiverses. Les pays Scandinaves ont dû fournir des montants tellement considérables pour venir à bout de la crise (jusqu'à 15 % du PIB en Finlande) qu'ils ont lourdement grevé les finances publiques. Aux Etats-Unis, les difficultés ont atteint une ampleur sans précédent depuis la dépression des années trente : environ 1500 banques commerciales et 1 200 caisses d'épargne ont fait faillite entre 1984 et 1995. Au Japon, on estime que les créances douteuses s'élèvent à 600 milliards de dollars pour l'ensemble des établissements de crédit. En France, la situation du Crédit Lyonnais, du Comptoir des Entrepreneurs et celle du Crédit Foncier sont bien connues. Le Royaume-Uni, enfin, a subi quelques faillites retentissantes dont celles de la BCCI et de la Barings. Comment rendre compte des difficultés croissantes que semble connaître /'intermediation bancaire traditionnelle, en même temps que de la diversité des situations nationales ? Trois éléments peuvent être mis en avant afin d'apporter une réponse à cette interrogation : la concentration des systèmes bancaires, l'ampjeui etja rapidité des changements réglementaires intervenus ces dernières années et la place de la banque dans l'organisation du système économique. Chacun de ces éléments intervient de façon différente dans chaque pays et est à l'origine d'un système bancaire unique dont les forces et les faiblesses s'articulent de façon différente. Se pose alors, notamment à l'échelle de l'Union européenne, le problème de l'organisation de la supervision des établissements bancaires et de la gestion des crises. La diversité des structures bancaires nationales et celle des futures instances européennes en charge de leur surveillance semblent telles qu'en l'absence d'une véritable autorité centrale, la stabilité de l'espace bancaire et financier européen n'apparaît pas véritablement assurée.

Suggested Citation

  • Thomas Lambert & Jacques Le Cacheux & Audrey Mahuet, 1997. "L'épidémie de crises bancaires dans les pays de l'OCDE," Revue de l'OFCE, Programme National Persée, vol. 61(1), pages 93-138.
  • Handle: RePEc:prs:rvofce:ofce_0751-6614_1997_num_61_1_1454
    DOI: 10.3406/ofce.1997.1454
    Note: DOI:10.3406/ofce.1997.1454
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.3406/ofce.1997.1454
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: https://www.persee.fr/doc/ofce_0751-6614_1997_num_61_1_1454
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.3406/ofce.1997.1454?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Jean-Charles Rochet, 1991. "Déréglementation et risque du secteur bancaire," Revue d'Économie Financière, Programme National Persée, vol. 19(4), pages 57-68.
    2. Patrice Geoffron, 1994. "Analyses structurelles des industries bancaires et nouvelle concurrence financière," Revue d'Économie Financière, Programme National Persée, vol. 28(1), pages 27-48.
    3. Takeo Hoshi & Anil Kashyap & David Scharfstein, 1991. "Corporate Structure, Liquidity, and Investment: Evidence from Japanese Industrial Groups," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 106(1), pages 33-60.
    4. Takeo Hoshi & Anil Kashyap & David Scharfstein, 1990. "Bank Monitoring and Investment: Evidence from the Changing Structure of Japanese Corporate Banking Relationships," NBER Chapters, in: Asymmetric Information, Corporate Finance, and Investment, pages 105-126, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. John H. Boyd & Mark Gertler, 1994. "The role of large banks in the recent U.S. banking crisis," Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, vol. 18(Win), pages 2-21.
    6. Douglas W. Diamond, 1984. "Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 51(3), pages 393-414.
    7. Cable, John R, 1985. "Capital Market Information and Industrial Performance: The Role of West German Banks," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 95(377), pages 118-132, March.
    8. BERNARD Shull, 1993. "How Should Bank Regulatory Agencies Be Organized?," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 11(1), pages 99-107, January.
    9. Sharpe, Steven A, 1990. "Asymmetric Information, Bank Lending, and Implicit Contracts: A Stylized Model of Customer Relationships," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 45(4), pages 1069-1087, September.
    10. Ugur Muldur, 1990. "Restructurations et stratégies dans le secteur financier européen," Revue d'Économie Financière, Programme National Persée, vol. 12(1), pages 155-193.
    11. Gilbert, R Alton, 1984. "Bank Market Structure and Competition: A Survey," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 16(4), pages 617-644, November.
    12. Gual, Jordi & Neven, Damien J, 1992. "Deregulation of the European Banking Industry (1980-1991)," CEPR Discussion Papers 703, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    13. Slovin, Myron B & Sushka, Marie E & Polonchek, John A, 1993. "The Value of Bank Durability: Borrowers as Bank Stakeholders," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 48(1), pages 247-266, March.
    14. Petersen, Mitchell A & Rajan, Raghuram G, 1994. "The Benefits of Lending Relationships: Evidence from Small Business Data," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 49(1), pages 3-37, March.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Thierry Chauveau & Jézabel Couppey, 1999. "Les banques françaises de réseaux n'ont pas de problèmes majeurs d'inefficacité productive : une application de la technique d'enveloppement des données (DEA)," Cahiers de la Maison des Sciences Economiques bla99092, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1).
    2. Thierry Chauveau & Jézabel Couppey, 1999. "Les banques françaises de réseaux n'ont pas de problèmes majeurs d'inefficacité productive : une application de la technique d'enveloppement des données (DEA)," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-03674624, HAL.
    3. Thierry Chauveau & Jézabel Couppey, 1999. "Les banques françaises de réseaux n'ont pas de problèmes majeurs d'inefficacité productive : une application de la technique d'enveloppement des données (DEA)," Post-Print halshs-03674624, HAL.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. repec:spo:wpmain:info:hdl:2441/2097 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/2097 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. repec:hal:wpspec:info:hdl:2441/2097 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. repec:spo:wpecon:info:hdl:2441/2097 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. den Haan, Wouter J. & Ramey, Garey & Watson, Joel, 2003. "Liquidity flows and fragility of business enterprises," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(6), pages 1215-1241, September.
    6. Ongena, S. & Smith, D.C., 2000. "Bank relationships : A review," Other publications TiSEM 993b88a5-9a0f-42de-9cec-6, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    7. Jarko Fidrmuc & Philipp Schreiber & Martin Siddiqui, 2018. "Intangible Assets and the Determinants of a Single Bank Relation of German SMEs," European Journal of Business Science and Technology, Mendel University in Brno, Faculty of Business and Economics, vol. 4(1), pages 5-30.
    8. V. M. González-Méndez & F. González-Rodríguez, 2000. "Un análisis de los efectos de la crisis de Banesto sobre la banca y la industria," Investigaciones Economicas, Fundación SEPI, vol. 24(3), pages 611-640, September.
    9. Cardone Riportella, Clara & Casasola, María José, 2005. "Do banking relationships improve credit conditions for Spanish SMEs?," DEE - Working Papers. Business Economics. WB wb052806, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía de la Empresa.
    10. Marco Becht & Carlos D. Ramírez, 2003. "Does Bank Affiliation Mitigate Liquidity Constraints? Evidence from Germany's Universal Banks in the Pre‐World War I Period," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 70(2), pages 254-272, October.
    11. Steven Ongena, 1999. "Lending Relationships, Bank Default and Economic Activity," International Journal of the Economics of Business, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 6(2), pages 257-280.
    12. Shin, G. Hwan & Fraser, Donald R. & Kolari, James W., 2003. "How does banking industry consolidation affect bank-firm relationships? Evidence from a large Japanese bank merger," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 11(3), pages 285-304, July.
    13. Allen N. Berger & Gregory F. Udell, 1994. "Lines of credit and relationship lending in small firm finance," Proceedings 52, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
    14. Wenlian Gao & Feifei Zhu & Kai Chen, 2023. "The role of bank lenders in firm leverage adjustments," Journal of Financial Research, Southern Finance Association;Southwestern Finance Association, vol. 46(1), pages 63-97, February.
    15. Limpaphayom, Piman & Rogers, Daniel A. & Yanase, Noriyoshi, 2019. "Bank equity ownership and corporate hedging: Evidence from Japan," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 58(C), pages 765-783.
    16. Bharath, Sreedhar & Dahiya, Sandeep & Saunders, Anthony & Srinivasan, Anand, 2007. "So what do I get? The bank's view of lending relationships," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 85(2), pages 368-419, August.
    17. Foroughfard, Rasoul & Rahmati, Mohammad, 2019. "The Effect of Relationship Lending on Loan Contract Terms," Journal of Money and Economy, Monetary and Banking Research Institute, Central Bank of the Islamic Republic of Iran, vol. 14(2), pages 133-157, April.
    18. Gajewski, Krzysztof & Pawłowska, Małgorzata & Rogowski, Wojciech, 2012. "Relacje firm z bankami w Polsce w świetle danych ze sprawozdawczości bankowej [Bank-firm relationships in Poland in the light of data from bank reporting]," MPRA Paper 42544, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 29 Oct 2012.
    19. Elsas, Ralf & Krahnen, Jan Pieter, 2003. "Universal Banks and Relationships with Firms," CFS Working Paper Series 2003/20, Center for Financial Studies (CFS).
    20. Yasuda, Ayako, 2007. "Bank relationships and underwriter competition: Evidence from Japan," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 86(2), pages 369-404, November.
    21. Longhofer, Stanley D. & Santos, Joao A. C., 2000. "The Importance of Bank Seniority for Relationship Lending," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 9(1), pages 57-89, January.
    22. repec:wop:calsdi:99-07r is not listed on IDEAS
    23. Masayo Shikimi, 2013. "Do firms benefit from multiple banking relationships? Evidence from small and medium- sized firms in Japan," International Economics and Economic Policy, Springer, vol. 10(1), pages 127-157, March.
    24. Elsas, Ralf & Krahnen, Jan Pieter, 1998. "Is relationship lending special? Evidence from credit-file data in Germany," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 22(10-11), pages 1283-1316, October.
    25. repec:wop:calsdi:99-07 is not listed on IDEAS
    26. Hubbard, R Glenn & Kuttner, Kenneth N & Palia, Darius N, 2002. "Are There Bank Effects in Borrowers' Costs of Funds? Evidence from a Matched Sample of Borrowers and Banks," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 75(4), pages 559-581, October.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:prs:rvofce:ofce_0751-6614_1997_num_61_1_1454. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Equipe PERSEE (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.persee.fr/collection/ofce .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.