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Vilfredo Pareto et le protectionnisme : l'économie politique appliquée, la sociologie générale et quelques paradoxes

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  • Philippe Steiner

Abstract

[eng] Pareto's position on protectionism has many facets but this paper shows that his position contains insighfull analytical ideas. Alongside his papers on pure international econo­mics, Pareto was a polemist fighting against the « modern plague » (protectionism) by the spread of the liberal doctrine. In the early 90' he was dissatisfied with this and he tried to understand why protectionism was expanding. In doing so, he gave one of the first study of the paradox of collective action in the second volume of his Cours [1897]. In his Trattato di sociologia générale, he developped a new paradox first raised in his Manuale : because of the links between economic and social events, a sub-optimal deci­sion (protectionism) in a sub-optimal situation can, paradoxically, lead to a better situa­tion. [fre] La position de Pareto face au protectionnisme est complexe en raison des dif­férents points de vue qu'il adopte au cours de sa trajectoire intellectuelle ; mais l'article montre que ses réflexions sur ce sujet sont riches et analytiquement nova­trices. Au-delà de ses travaux d'économie pure, il se fait polémiste pour diffuser les saines doctrines libérales de façon à faire reculer la « peste » protectionniste. Mais cette attitude ne satisfait pas pleinement l'auteur qui, au début des années 1890, s'efforce de comprendre le maintien d'une telle politique économique. À cette occasion, il donne, dès le Cours (1897), une des premières formulations du paradoxe de l'action collective. Par la suite, avec le Traité de sociologie générale, // développe l'objection qu'il s'était faite à lui-même dans le Manuel : en raison des interactions socio-économiques, une mesure sous-optimale dans un état de société sous-optimal peut, paradoxalement, produire une amélioration de l'état de société.

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  • Philippe Steiner, 1995. "Vilfredo Pareto et le protectionnisme : l'économie politique appliquée, la sociologie générale et quelques paradoxes," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 46(5), pages 1241-1262.
    • Handle: RePEc:prs:reveco:reco_0035-2764_1995_num_46_5_409732
    DOI: 10.3406/reco.1995.409732
    Note: DOI:10.3406/reco.1995.409732
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Bhagwati, Jagdish N., 1980. "Lobbying and welfare," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 14(3), pages 355-363, December.
    2. Krueger, Anne O, 1974. "The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 64(3), pages 291-303, June.
    3. P. Hennipman, 1982. "Wicksell and Pareto: Their Relationship in the Theory of Public Finance," History of Political Economy, Duke University Press, vol. 14(1), pages 37-64, Spring.
    4. Patricia J. Euzent & Thomas L. Martin, 1984. "Classical Roots of the Emerging Theory of Rent Seeking: the Contribution of Jean-Baptiste Say," History of Political Economy, Duke University Press, vol. 16(2), pages 255-262, Summer.
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    Cited by:

    1. Paul Dalziel & Jane Higgins, 2006. "Pareto, Parsons, and the Boundary Between Economics and Sociology," American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 65(1), pages 109-126, January.
    2. Claire Baldin & Ludovic Ragni, 2015. "Théorie des élites parétienne et moment machiavélien comme principes explicatifs de la dynamique sociale : les limites de la méthode des approximations successives," GREDEG Working Papers 2015-19, Groupe de REcherche en Droit, Economie, Gestion (GREDEG CNRS), Université Côte d'Azur, France.
    3. Claire Baldin & Ludovic Ragni, 2014. "La rupture du moment machiavélien dans l’économie et la sociologie politique de Pareto : risque d’incohérence pour la méthode des approximations successives," Post-Print halshs-01241318, HAL.
    4. Enrico Colombatto, 2000. "An Explanation of the Dynamics of Protectionism," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 11(3), pages 279-293, July.

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