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Externalités et asymétries d'information dans un modèle de croissance

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  • Dominique Guellec

Abstract

[eng] Externalities and information asymmetry in a model of growth. . Endogenous growth models underline the impact of externalities. They result in a decen­tralized equilibrium rate of growth which is not socially efficient. The Coase theorem states that a necessary condition for such an inefficiency is the positivity of transaction costs which prevent the agents from contracting on the gains that could be realized. The model taken up in the paper represents the coordination issues in an endogenous growth model with externalities as a repeated prisonners dilemma. The level of transaction costs (examplified by information asymmetry), the number of agents involved in the interac­tion and the repeated character of the interaction determine the equilibrium growth rate that can be reached by the system. In that sense institutions, that shape the previous fea­tures, help explaining the diversity of growth rates in space and time. [fre] La théorie de la croissance endogène souligne impact des extemalités sur la croissance économique Le taux de croissance associé équilibre concurrentiel est donc généralement sous-optimal Le théorème de Coase implique une telle situation ne peut se produire que si les coûts de transaction sont positifs Cet article présente un modèle où ces coûts sont introduits sous la forme une asy métrie information et où les agents sont liés par des interactions stratégiques Le problème de la coordination se ramène un dilemme du prisonnier répété inci tation pour les agents coopérer et donc internaliser les extemalités dépend du caractère répété de interaction du nombre de partenaires et du niveau des coûts de transaction Les arrangements institutionnels qui déterminent ces variables influent donc sur le taux de croissance des économies et peuvent expliquer la diversité internationale constatée

Suggested Citation

  • Dominique Guellec, 1995. "Externalités et asymétries d'information dans un modèle de croissance," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 46(3), pages 837-846.
  • Handle: RePEc:prs:reveco:reco_0035-2764_1995_num_46_3_409696
    DOI: 10.3406/reco.1995.409696
    Note: DOI:10.3406/reco.1995.409696
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