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Créanciers mixtes, liquidation et refinancement des entreprises : une analyse théorique

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  • Jean-Daniel Guigou

Abstract

[fre] Créanciers mixtes, liquidation et refinancement des entreprises. Une analyse théorique . . Nous examinons les différents rôles que peut jouer un « créancier mixte » (à la fois prêteur et actionnaire) dans la survie des entreprises. Plus précisément, nous partons du fait qu'un créancier mixte a une structure d'incitation spécifique, qui le différencie d'un « créancier pur » (prêteur ou actionnaire). Un créancier mixte a les incitations nécessaires pour prendre en considération les effets de ses décisions sur les autres créanciers. Nous considérons deux types de décision : la décision de liquidation et la décision de refinancement. Nous montrons qu'un créancier mixte a moins d'incitation qu'un créancier pur à choisir une décision de liquidation (ou de continuation) individuellement optimale mais collectivement sous-optimale, et plus d'incitation que n'importe quel autre investisseur, interne ou externe, à refinancer une entreprise défaillante. [eng] Mixed creditors, liquidation and extending credit of firms : a theoritic al analysis. . We examine the different roles that a « mixed creditor » (both lender and shareholder) may play in the survival of firms. More precisely, we start from the fact that a « mixed creditor » has a specific incentive structure, which differentiates him from a « pure creditor » (lender or shareholder). A mixed creditor has the necessary incentives for taking into account the effects of his decisions on the other creditors. We consider two types of decision : the liquidation decision and the extending credit decision. We show that a mixed creditor has less incentive than a pure creditor to chose a liquidation (or a continuation) decision which is individually optimal but collectively sub-optimal, and more incentive than any other investor, internal or external, for extending credit of a defaulting firm.

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  • Jean-Daniel Guigou, 1995. "Créanciers mixtes, liquidation et refinancement des entreprises : une analyse théorique," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 46(1), pages 5-12.
    • Handle: RePEc:prs:reveco:reco_0035-2764_1995_num_46_1_409625
    DOI: 10.3406/reco.1995.409625
    Note: DOI:10.3406/reco.1995.409625
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    1. Catherine Refait, 2005. "Soutien financier ou mise en faillite de l'entreprise? Comprendre la décision de la banque," Revue Finance Contrôle Stratégie, revues.org, vol. 8(1), pages 131-157, March.

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