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Cohérence temporelle des politiques économiques dans un modèle avec équation d'anticipation

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  • Bertrand Crettez

Abstract

[fre] Cohérence temporelle des politiques économiques dans un modèle avec équation d'anticipations. . Dans cet article, on étudie la cohérence temporelle des politiques économiques dans un modèle avec équation d'anticipations. Il s'agit d'un modèle à géné­rations à la Samuelson dans lequel une Banque centrale contrôle l'offre de monnaie dans le but d'atteindre un objectif intertemporel. On étudie d'abord la politique optimale temporellement incohérente. Suivant Cohen et Michel, on clarifie ensuite l'étude des politiques temporellement cohérentes en distinguant deux cas. Dans le premier cas, à chaque période, la Banque centrale et les agents privés agissent simultanément. Dans le second cas, la Banque centrale agit avant les agents privés. Enfin, pour chacun des deux cas, on étudie des équilibres de réputations (ou avec menaces) à la Barro et Gordon. Le résultat principal de l'article est le suivant dans le cas où la Banque centrale agit avant les agents privés, l'équilibre de réputation soutenu par des menaces est indépendant du facteur d'actualisation de la Banque centrale. [eng] Time-consistency of economic policies in a model with a forward looking expectations equation. In this paper we study the time consistency of economie policies in a model with a forward looking equation. This is an overlapping-generation model a la Samuelson. A central bank is assumed to control the supply of money in order to satisfy an intertemporal objective. As usual, the optimal policy is time inconsistent (however we show that this policy may be counter-cyclical). Following Cohen and Michel, we study the time-consistent policies in two cases. In the first case, we suppose that the central bank and the private agents act simultaneously in each period. In the second case, the central bank is supposed to act before the private agent. For each case we study the reputational equili-bria a la Barro et Gordon. In the first case, we have the Barro and Gordon resuit that the optimal constant rule is a reputational equilibrium if the rate of time preference of the central bank is small enough. However, we show that, in the second case, the optimal constant rule is a reputational equilibrium whatever the rate of time preference may be.

Suggested Citation

  • Bertrand Crettez, 1994. "Cohérence temporelle des politiques économiques dans un modèle avec équation d'anticipation," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 45(4), pages 989-1008.
    • Handle: RePEc:prs:reveco:reco_0035-2764_1994_num_45_4_409587
    DOI: 10.3406/reco.1994.409587
    Note: DOI:10.3406/reco.1994.409587
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Barro, Robert J & Gordon, David B, 1983. "A Positive Theory of Monetary Policy in a Natural Rate Model," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(4), pages 589-610, August.
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    8. Levine, Paul L, 1988. "Does Time Inconsistency Matter?," CEPR Discussion Papers 227, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    9. Taub, Bart, 1986. "Asymptotic Properties of Pipeline Control of the Money Supply," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 27(3), pages 647-665, October.
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