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Comment limiter les méfaits des marchés internes du travail

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  • Patrick Artus
  • Moncef Kaabi

Abstract

[eng] How to limit the negative effects of insider labor markets ?. . Wage formation with insiders'labor markets is such that unemployed are not hired again when the economy recovers. We analyse the effects on this perverse dynamics of wages and employment of the implementation of a centralized wage bargaining, of firing costs, or of the replacement of a monopolistic wage determination by a bargaining between firms and unions. We finally examine on time-series data if econometric estimations confirm the existence of an insiders'labor market in France. [fre] Comment limiter les méfaits des marchés internes du travail. . L'existence de marchés internes du travail implique que la formation des salaires est telle que les chômeurs ne retrouvent pas d'emploi lorsque l'économie redémarre. Nous nous demandons si cette dynamique perverse des salaires et de l'emploi peut être modifiée par une centralisation accrue des négociations salariales, par l'introduction de coûts de licenciement, par la négociation et non la fixation monopolistique du salaire. Nous examinons finalement sur données agrégées si les estimations économétriques confirment l'existence d'un marché interne du travail en France.

Suggested Citation

  • Patrick Artus & Moncef Kaabi, 1994. "Comment limiter les méfaits des marchés internes du travail," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 45(3), pages 369-384.
    • Handle: RePEc:prs:reveco:reco_0035-2764_1994_num_45_3_409531
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    References listed on IDEAS

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