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Propriété et contrôle dans la grande entreprise. Une relecture de Berle et Means

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  • Jean Magnan de Bornier

Abstract

[eng] Ownership and control in the big corporation: a re-reading of Berle and Means. . This contribution reviews, in the spirit of the Property Rights Doctrine, Berle and Means' analysis of private property within big corporations, as it was elaborated in the thirties. Arguments suggesting that the « managerial revolution » profoundly modified ownership and weakened it are examined and criticized ; they rely in the author's opinion on too restrictive and inaccurate a conception of the ownership relation within the firm. Other arguments that the separation of ownership and control undermines (the firm's or the capitalist system's as a whole) efficiency are also scrutinized and seem inadequate when considering the capacity of human society to achieve self-organisation through exchange relations. [fre] Propriété et contrôle dans la grande entreprise : une relecture de Berle et Means. . On examine dans ce texte, dans l'optique de la théorie des droits de propriété, l'analyse de la propriété élaborée dans les années 1930 par Berle et Means concernant les grandes sociétés par actions. Les arguments selon lesquels l'actionnariat a modifié en profondeur la propriété et l'a affaiblie sont passés en revue et critiqués ; ils reposent, selon l'auteur, sur une conception restrictive et inadéquate du lien de propriété à l'intérieur de l'entreprise. Les arguments divers selon lesquels l'actionnariat nuit à l'efficacité (de la firme ou du système capitaliste) sont aussi passés au crible et paraissent faibles au regard de l'aptitude de la société humaine à s'auto-organiser, en particulier à travers l'échange.

Suggested Citation

  • Jean Magnan de Bornier, 1987. "Propriété et contrôle dans la grande entreprise. Une relecture de Berle et Means," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 38(6), pages 1171-1190.
  • Handle: RePEc:prs:reveco:reco_0035-2764_1987_num_38_6_409030
    DOI: 10.3406/reco.1987.409030
    Note: DOI:10.3406/reco.1987.409030
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Henry G. Manne, 1965. "Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 73(2), pages 110-110.
    2. Stigler, George J & Friedland, Claire, 1983. "The Literature of Economics: The Case of Berle and Means," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(2), pages 237-268, June.
    3. Fama, Eugene F & Jensen, Michael C, 1983. "Separation of Ownership and Control," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(2), pages 301-325, June.
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    5. Henry G. Manne, 1965. "Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 73(4), pages 351-351.
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    7. Roger S. Frantz, 1980. "On the Existence of X-Efficiency," Journal of Post Keynesian Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 2(4), pages 509-527, July.
    8. Demsetz, Harold, 1983. "The Structure of Ownership and the Theory of the Firm," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(2), pages 375-390, June.
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