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Coût et efficacité de l'impôt négatif

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  • Lionel Stoléru

Abstract

[fre] L'objet de l'article est d'introduire une approche « coût-avantage » des différents barèmes de l'impôt négatif sur le revenu, pouvant être définis par un ou deux paramètres fondamentaux : le montant du revenu garanti G, le taux de l'impôt r, le seuil d'accès B. Du côté du coût, il apparaît que les modèles de distribution du revenu selon la taille de la famille peuvent être synthétisés par une seule fonction de coût S (B) ; S (B) est indépendante des paramètres du plan d'impôt négatif sur le revenu (I.N.) et donne le coût d'un «plan de base» permettant à chaque individu d'atteindre le niveau de revenu B. Alors, le coût de n'importe quel plan d'I.N. (r,B) est tout simplement r,S (B). Du côté des avantages, on introduit un concept d'efficacité en termes de pourcentage de la population restant au-dessous du seuil de pauvreté, après avoir bénéficié des aides. Si l'on cherche à rendre minimum ce pourcentage, on définit un optimum qui est habituellement un plan « équilibré » avec un taux d'impôt optimum variant de 0 à 100 %. La discussion des concepts d'optimum et d'efficacité conduit à la conclusion que l'analyse coût-avantage pourrait et devrait être appliquée à l'évaluation des plans de revenu garanti. [eng] Optimum negative income taxes. The purpose of the article is to introduce a " cost-benefit" approach of the alternative negative income tax schedules which can be defined by either 2 of 3 basic parameters : guarantee level G, tax rate r, break-even income B. On the cost side, it is shown that income-distribution patterns by family size can be synthetized ivithin a single cost function S (B) which is independent of the parameters of the negative income tax scheme and which gives the cost of the flat scheme bringing everybody to the B income level. Then, the cost of any N.I.T. scheme [r,B] is just r,S (B). On the benefit side, an efficiency concept is introduced in terms of the percentage of population which remains below the poverty Une after benefits. Minimizing this percentage defines an optimum which will usually be a "balanced " scheme with an optimum tax rate different from 0 or 100 percent. Discussion of the optimum and efficiency concepts leads to the conclusion that cosf~benefit analysis could and should be applied to assessment of income-maintenance schemes.

Suggested Citation

  • Lionel Stoléru, 1974. "Coût et efficacité de l'impôt négatif," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 25(5), pages 745-761.
    • Handle: RePEc:prs:reveco:reco_0035-2764_1974_num_25_5_408172
    DOI: 10.3406/reco.1974.408172
    Note: DOI:10.3406/reco.1974.408172
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Zeckhauser, Richard J, 1971. "Optimal Mechanisms for Income Transfer," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 61(3), pages 324-334, June.
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