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Économie néo-institutionnelle et politique de la concurrence les cas des formes organisationnelles hybrides

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  • Claude Ménard

Abstract

[eng] New institutional economics and competition policy: the case of hybrid organizations - This paper intends to examine how recent developments in new institutional economics should provide incentives for revising substantial aspects of competition policies. The core argument is based on recent developments in the analysis of organizational arrangements identified as "hybrids ". The paper is organized in three sections. Section I look at the main characteristics of these organizational forms. Section II develops a model designed for providing a better understanding of the impact of regulatory and competition policies on these arrangements. Section III explores the substantial questions that the characteristics of hybrids raise for competition policies that are deeply anchored in the binary logic of "markets vs. integrated firms". [fre] L'objet de cet article est d'examiner comment la prise en compte des développements de l'analyse néo-institutionnelle devrait conduire à revoir des aspects essentiels de la politique de la concurrence. Le raisonnement s'appuie sur les apports récents concernant les arrangements organisa- tionnels « hybrides ». L'article est organisé en trois points. Une première partie examine ce qu'il faut entendre par « formes hybrides » et ce qui les caractérise. La deuxième partie propose un cadre d'analyse destiné à mieux appréhender les effets des politiques réglementaires et de concurrence sur ces arrangements. La troisième partie explore les questions que ces caractéristiques soulèvent eu égard à un droit de la concurrence très fortement ancré dans la dichotomie « marché vs. entreprise intégrée ».

Suggested Citation

  • Claude Ménard, 2003. "Économie néo-institutionnelle et politique de la concurrence les cas des formes organisationnelles hybrides," Économie rurale, Programme National Persée, vol. 277(1), pages 45-60.
    • Handle: RePEc:prs:recoru:ecoru_0013-0559_2003_num_277_1_5435
    DOI: 10.3406/ecoru.2003.5435
    Note: DOI:10.3406/ecoru.2003.5435
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