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Le brevet : un instrument d'appropriation des innovations technologiques

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  • Dominique Guellec
  • Isabelle Kabla

Abstract

[fre] Le brevet, un instrument d'appropriation . Les entreprises ne peuvent rentabiliser leurs dépenses de recherche que si elles sont en mesure de s'approprier les bénéfices de leurs innovations. D'un point de vue légal, le brevet remplit ce rôle en conférant à son détenteur le monopole d'exploitation de son invention. . La théorie économique s'interroge sur les conséquences de ces monopoles - concurrence induite par la course aux brevets entre les entreprises, non-optimalité de l'effort de recherche - et sur les moyens d'y remédier. . des innovations technologiques . Dans les faits, le brevet ne garantit pas toujours l'appropriation technologique à leurs inventeurs : certaines innovations ne sont pas entièrement brevetables, les brevets sont souvent contoumables et les contrefaçons possibles. Mais les limites du brevet pourraient n'avoir qu'une influence modérée sur les incitations à innover ; l'imitation, longue et coûteuse, ne réduit que partiellement les bénéfices de la recherche pour les innovateurs. [eng] The Patent, a Means of Owning Technological Innovations . Companies can only make their research expenditure pay if they are able to reap the profits of their innovations. The patent fulfils this role from a legal point of view by giving its holder a monopoly over the use of his invention. . Economic theory is probing the consequences of these monopolies - such as the competition generated by firms joining the race to patent and also research not being developed to the utmost - and is examining ways of remedying the situation. . A patent does not always guarantee its inventors technological ownership in practice: some innovations are not entirely patentable and patents can often be circumvented and infringed. Yet the patent's limits should only really have a moderate influence on incentives to innovate; time-consuming and expensive imitations only partially reduce the profits from the research for the innovators. [spa] La patente, una herramienta de apropiaciôn de las innovaciones tecnolôgicas . Las empresas solo pueden rentabilizar sus gastos de investigation si son capaces de apropiarse los beneficios de sus innovaciones. Desde el punto de vista legal, la patente desempena este papel al otorgarle a quien la posée el monopolio de explotaciôn de la propia invention. . La teoria econômica considéra las consecuencias de dichos monopolios - competencia inducida por la rivalidad por las patentes entre empresas, no optimalidad del esfuerzo de investigation - y sus remedios. . En la realidad, la patente no siempre les garantiza la apropiaciôn tecnôlogica a sus inventores : ciertas innovaciones no son del todo patentables, las patentes a menudo se pueden evitar, y son posibles las falsificaciones. Con todo, los limites de la patente parecen tener solo una influencia reducida sobre las incitaciones a innovar ; la imitation, larga y costosa, apenas reduce de manera muy limitada los beneficios de la investigation para los innovadores.

Suggested Citation

  • Dominique Guellec & Isabelle Kabla, 1994. "Le brevet : un instrument d'appropriation des innovations technologiques," Économie et Statistique, Programme National Persée, vol. 275(1), pages 83-94.
  • Handle: RePEc:prs:ecstat:estat_0336-1454_1994_num_275_1_5891
    DOI: 10.3406/estat.1994.5891
    Note: DOI:10.3406/estat.1994.5891
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    2. Fabienne Orsi & Jean-Paul Moatti, 2001. "D'un droit de propriété intellectuelle sur le vivant aux firmes de génomique : vers une marchandisation de la connaissance scientifique sur le génome humain," Économie et Prévision, Programme National Persée, vol. 150(4), pages 123-138.
    3. Nicolas Iung & Frédéric Rupprecht, 1998. "Le marché pharmaceutique français : la prépondérance des produits-phares," Économie et Statistique, Programme National Persée, vol. 312(1), pages 21-33.
    4. Boisvert, Valerie & Vivien, Franck-Dominique, 2005. "The convention on biological diversity: A conventionalist approach," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(4), pages 461-472, June.
    5. Valérie Boisvert & Franck-Dominique Vivien, 2005. "Tiers Monde et biodiversité : tristes tropiques ou tropiques d'abondance ? La régulation internationale des ressources génétiques mise en perspective," Post-Print hal-04188412, HAL.

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