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Le marché pharmaceutique français : la prépondérance des produits-phares

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  • Nicolas Iung
  • Frédéric Rupprecht

Abstract

[spa] El mercado farmaceùtico francés : la preponderancia de los productos faros . Si bien numerosos productos farmaceûticos gozan de un permiso de puesta en el mercado y son comercializados, solo un numéro reducido realiza ventas importantes : los primeras cien hacen mâs de la tercera parte de las ventas del sector. Aunque existe un numéro bastante elevado de categorfas terapeiticas, cada empresa realiza ventas relevantes en uno o tan solo dos de ellas. Esta paradoja aparente se explica, entre otras razones, por una estructura de mercado que descansa sobre una categorîa de productos farmaceûticos que cada laboratorio desea desarrollar : los productos faros o los blockbusters. A estos productos se debe la mitad de las ventas de los laboratorios, en un promedio, ganando râpidamente aquéllos importantes cuotas en un mercado en râpida evoluciôn. Su importancia creciente asociada a la subida de los costos de I+D contribuye a explicar los movimientos recientes de la industria farmaceûtica. Una estrategia de diversificaciôn de los riesgos impone, en efecto, el reducir la dependencia respecto a estos productos faros. La constitucion de una entidad de produccion mayor por adquisiciôn o fusion permite reducir su cuota en el volumen de negocios total. [fre] Le marché pharmaceutique français : la prépondérance des produits-phares . Si de nombreux produits pharmaceutiques disposent d'une autorisation de mise sur le marché et sont commercialisés, seul un nombre limité d'entre eux réalise des ventes conséquentes : les cent premiers assurent plus du tiers des ventes du secteur. Bien qu'il existe un nombre relativement important de classes thérapeutiques, chaque entreprise réalise des ventes significatives sur seulement une ou deux d'entre elles. Ce paradoxe apparent s'explique notamment par une structure de marché s'appuyant sur un type de produits pharmaceutiques que chaque laboratoire espère développer : les produits-phares ou blockbusters. Ces produits sont à l'origine de la moitié des ventes des laboratoires, en moyenne, et acquièrent très rapidement des parts de marché conséquentes sur un marché en renouvellement rapide. Leur importance croissante associée à la hausse des coûts de recherche- développement contribue à expliquer les mouvements récents de l'industrie pharmaceutique. Une stratégie de diversification des risques impose, en effet, de réduire la dépendance vis-à-vis de ces produits-phares. La constitution d'une entité de production plus grande par acquisition ou fusion permet alors d'en faire baisser la part dans le chiffre d'affaires total. [eng] The French Pharmaceutical Market: The Preponderance of Blockbuster Products . Although many pharmaceutical products are market-approved and sold, only a limited number of them make significant sales. The top 100 products make more than one-third of the sector's sales. Although there is a relatively large number of therapeutic categories, each company makes significant sales on only one or two of them. This paradox can be explained mainly by a market structure based on one type of pharmaceutical product that each laboratory hope to develop: blockbusters. On average, these products account for half of the laboratories' sales and promptly take considerable market shares on a market with a high percentage of new products. Their growing share and the rise in research and development costs help to explain recent trends in the pharmaceutical industry. A risk diversification strategy is called for to reduce dependency on these blockbusters. Mergers and acquisitions to form larger production entities is one way of reducing their share in the total turnover. [ger] Der pharmazeutische Markt in Frankreich: die Vormachtstellung der Schlùsselprodukte. Zahlreiche Arzneimittel verfûgen zwar ùber eine Zulassung fur ihre Inverkehrbringung und werden auch kommerzialisiert, aber nur wenige von ihnen erzielen einen nennenswerten Umsatz: auf die hundert wichtigsten entfâllt mehr als ein Drittel des Umsatzes in diesem Sektor. Obwohl es eine relativ groBe Anzahl therapeutischer Klassen gibt, erzielt jedes Unternehmen lediglich mit einer oder zwei von ihnen einen hohen Umsatz. . Dieses offensichtliche Paradox erklàrt sich insbesondere durch eine Marktstruktur, die auf einem bestimmten Typ pharmazeutischer Produkte basiert, den jedes Labor zu entwickein hofft: die Schlùsselprodukte oder blockbusters. . Dièse Produkte machen im Schnitt die Hàlfte des Umsatzes der Laboratorien aus und sichern sich sehr rasch erhebliche Anteile auf einem Markt, der sich schnell veràndert. Ihre zunehmende Bedeutung sowie der Anstieg der Forschungs- und Entwicklungskosten erklâren unter anderem die jùngsten Entwicklungen, die die pharmazeutische Industrie kannte. Folglich ist eine Stratégie der Risikodiversifizierung erforderlich, die die Abhângigkeit von diesen Schlûsselprodukten reduziert. Die Bildung einer grôBeren Produktionseinheit durch Erwerb oder Fusion ermôglicht es dann, deren Anteil am Gesamtumsatz zu senken.

Suggested Citation

  • Nicolas Iung & Frédéric Rupprecht, 1998. "Le marché pharmaceutique français : la prépondérance des produits-phares," Économie et Statistique, Programme National Persée, vol. 312(1), pages 21-33.
  • Handle: RePEc:prs:ecstat:estat_0336-1454_1998_num_312_1_2616
    DOI: 10.3406/estat.1998.2616
    Note: DOI:10.3406/estat.1998.2616
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    5. Henry Grabowski & John Vernon, 1990. "A New Look at the Returns and Risks to Pharmaceutical R&D," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 36(7), pages 804-821, July.
    6. Edouard Martin, 1996. "Recherche pharmaceutique, prix du médicament et assurance-maladie," Revue Française d'Économie, Programme National Persée, vol. 11(1), pages 49-86.
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