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La conduite des politiques économiques et le policy-mix dans l'UEM

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  • Jean Cordier
  • Pierre Jaillet
  • Dominique Plihon

Abstract

[eng] Running Economic Policies and the EMU Policy Mix . The Maastricht Treaty imposes rules of strict budgetary discipline and increased supervision on its members. Yet it barely changes the institutional context of economic policies, whose framework has remained relatively open. . The Member States' abandonment of their monetary autonomy raises the question as to what adjustment instruments are available. This abandonment merely sanctions an established fact: the gradual elimination of foreign exchange rates as instruments of economic policy as well as the integration of Member States' economies, which limits the risk of shocks specific to one country or another. The external constraint will be reduced in the short term, thereby giving national policies more room for manœvre. However, the strengthening of Member State interdependence could accentuate external effects on their partners. . National economic policies will be the main recourse against long-lasting shocks centred on one area or sector. Active co-ordination will nevertheless be needed between the different States. Finally, the Community's monetary policy needs to be reconciled with the decentralized monetary policies. This implies defining the original details of the policy mix. [spa] La conducta de las polîticas econômicas y el policy-mix en la UEM . El Tratado de la Union impone a sus miembros unas reglas estrictas de disciplina presupuestaria y una mayor vigilancia. En cambio poco modifica el contexto institucional de las polîticas econômicas, cuyo marco permanece bastante abierto. . El abandono por cada estado de su autonomfa monetaria plantea el problema de los instrumentas de ajuste de los que puede disponer. Dicho abandono solo censura una situaciôn de hecho : el progresivo debilitamiento del tipo de cambio en cuanto se le considéra instrumento de polftica econômica, asî como la integraciôn de las economîas de los Estados miembros, que limita el riesgo de choques propios de tal o cual pais. La presiôn externa se aliviarâ a corto plazo otorgândoles a las polîticas nacionales mayor amplitud de maniobra. Sin embargo el refuerzo de la interdependencia de los Estados miembros podrfa acentuar los efectos externos en los païses clientes. . Las polîticas econômicas nacionales constituirân el recurso esencial contra choques duraderos focalizados en una zona o un sector. Una coordinaciôn activa sera sin embargo necesaria entre los diferentes estados. Harâ falta también conciliar la polftica monetaria comunitaria con las polfticas presupuestarias descentralizadas, lo cual supone définir unas modalidades originales de "policy-mix". [fre] La conduite des politiques économiques et le policy-mix dans l'UEM . Le Traité de l'Union impose à ses membres des règles de discipline budgétaire strictes et une surveillance accrue. Il modifie peu en revanche le contexte institutionnel des politiques économiques, dont le cadre reste relativement ouvert. . L'abandon par chaque Etat de son autonomie monétaire pose la question des instruments d'ajustement disponibles. Cet abandon ne fait que sanctionner un état de fait : l'effacement progressif du taux de change en tant qu'instrument de la politique économique, autant que l'intégration des économies des États membres, qui limite le risque de chocs spécifiques à tel ou tel pays. La contrainte extérieure sera allégée sur le court terme, donnant ainsi des marges de manoeuvre accrues aux politiques nationales. Cependant, le renforcement de l'interdépendance des États membres pourrait accentuer les effets externes sur leurs partenaires. . Les politiques économiques nationales constitueront le recours essentiel contre des chocs durables focalisés sur une zone ou un secteur. Une coordination active sera toutefois nécessaire entre les différents États. Il faudra enfin concilier la politique monétaire communautaire avec les politiques budgétaires décentralisées, ce qui suppose de définir des modalités originales de policy-mix. [ger] Die nationalen Wirtschaftspolitiken und das Policy-Mix in der WWU . Der Unionsvertrag schreibt den Mitgliedstaaten zwar eine strenge Haushaltsdisziplin und eine verstârkte Wachsamkeit vor, àndert aber nur wenig den institutionellen Rahmen fur die Durchfùhrung der Wirtschaftspolitiken, der relativ offen bleibt. . Bei der Aufgabe derwàhrungspolitischen Unabhângigkeit durch die einzelnen Mitgliedstaaten stellt sich die Frage nach den verfùgbaren Anpassungsmechanismen. Dièse Souverànitàtsabtretung ist allerdings nur die Sanktionierung eines bereits vollzogenen Prozesses, in dessen Verlauf die Wechselkurse allmâhlich ihre Rolle als Instrument der nationalen Wirtschaftspolitik verloren und die einzelnen Volkswirtschaften derart miteinander verflochten wurden, daB das Risiko landesspezifischer Erschùtterungen gemindert werden konnte. Kurzfristig . werden die àuBeren Zwânge geringer werden, wodurch die nationalen Politiken einen grôBeren Handlungsspielraum erhalten. Im Gefolge der zunehmenden wirtschaftlichen Interdependenz der Mitgliedstaaten kônnten allerdings auch die externen Effekte auf ihre Partner grôBer werden. . Die nationalen Wirtschaftspolitiken werden das wichtigste Instrument zur Abfederung von dauerhaften und auf eine bestimmte Region bzw. einen bestimmten Sektor konzentrierten Erschùtterungen darstellen. Hierzu ist jedoch eine aktive Koordination zwischen den einzelnen Staaten unabdingbar. Ferner muB die Wâhrungspolitik der Gemeinschaft mit den nationalen Haushaltspolitiken in Einklang gebracht werden, was die Definition origineller Verfahren des "policy mix" voraussetzt.

Suggested Citation

  • Jean Cordier & Pierre Jaillet & Dominique Plihon, 1993. "La conduite des politiques économiques et le policy-mix dans l'UEM," Économie et Statistique, Programme National Persée, vol. 262(1), pages 37-48.
  • Handle: RePEc:prs:ecstat:estat_0336-1454_1993_num_262_1_5720
    DOI: 10.3406/estat.1993.5720
    Note: DOI:10.3406/estat.1993.5720
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    References listed on IDEAS

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