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Fusions horizontales sur le marché de l'Internet

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  • Thomas Cortade
  • Edmond Baranes

Abstract

[fre] Cet article étudie la question de l’articulation entre réglementation et politique de la concurrence dans le cadre de l’économie d’Internet. Nous nous intéressons en particulier au contrôle du pouvoir de marché des backbones. Pour cela, nous construisons un jeu en deux étapes. À la première étape, le backbone en monopole fixe son prix d’accès. À la seconde étape, les Fournisseurs d’accès à Internet (FAI) se concurrencent en tarifs binômes sur le marché en aval. Nous montrons alors qu’une certaine souplesse en matière de contrôle des structures sur le marché en aval peut, sous certaines conditions, limiter le pouvoir de marché en amont et ainsi permettre de contourner le problème de réglementation du backbone. [eng] This paper focuses on the vertical relationship between Internet Backbone Providers (IBPs) and Internet Service Providers (ISPs), and the difficulties created in that relationship by the IBPs’ strong market power. We propose a two-stage sequential game to analyze competition between horizontally differentiated ISPs in the service market and IBP Cournot competition in the backbone market. When the backbone market is unregulated, we find that consolidation among ISPs may reduce access charges by leveraging positive externalities in installed bases.

Suggested Citation

  • Thomas Cortade & Edmond Baranes, 2007. "Fusions horizontales sur le marché de l'Internet," Économie et Prévision, Programme National Persée, vol. 178(2), pages 67-77.
    • Handle: RePEc:prs:ecoprv:ecop_0249-4744_2007_num_178_2_7642
    DOI: 10.3406/ecop.2007.7642
    Note: DOI:10.3406/ecop.2007.7642
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    References listed on IDEAS

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