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Un modèle d'enchères de bois sur pied

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  • Bernard Elyakime
  • Patrice Loisel

Abstract

[eng] Modelling Standing Timber Auctions by Bernard Elyakime and Patrice Loisel . In France, standing timber is often sold by auction with a secret reservation price and vaguely defined quantities. We propose two models in which there is an independent private value and different buyers' and sellers' estimates of quantities: one with a known reservation price and then one with a secret reservation price. We study the buyers' and sellers' strategies for working out the seller's expected revenues with and without a secret reserve price. The seller does better in an auction with a secret reservation price under certain market conditions. [fre] Un modèle d'enchères de bois sur pied par Bernard Elyakime et Patrice Loisel . Les bois sur pied sont souvent vendus en France par enchères avec prix de retrait secret dans lesquelles le produit est mal défini quant à son volume. Nous étudions un modèle en valeur privée indépendante avec un volume de bois estimé différemment par les acheteurs et le vendeur, en prix de retrait public puis secret. Nous déterminons les stratégies des acheteurs et vendeur pour calculer l'espérance d'utilité du vendeur dans chacun des modèles. Celle du modèle à prix de retrait secret est alors supérieure à celle du modèle à prix de retrait public sous certaines conditions de marché.

Suggested Citation

  • Bernard Elyakime & Patrice Loisel, 1998. "Un modèle d'enchères de bois sur pied," Économie et Prévision, Programme National Persée, vol. 132(1), pages 93-101.
    • Handle: RePEc:prs:ecoprv:ecop_0249-4744_1998_num_132_1_5902
    DOI: 10.3406/ecop.1998.5902
    Note: DOI:10.3406/ecop.1998.5902
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Bernard Elyakime & Patrice Loisel, 1997. "Asymétrie dans des enchères à prix de retrait secret," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 48(4), pages 835-851.
    2. Riley, John G & Samuelson, William F, 1981. "Optimal Auctions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 381-392, June.
    3. Vincent Daniel R., 1995. "Bidding Off the Wall: Why Reserve Prices May Be Kept Secret," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 65(2), pages 575-584, April.
    4. Maskin, Eric S & Riley, John G, 1984. "Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(6), pages 1473-1518, November.
    5. Robert Wilson, 1977. "A Bidding Model of Perfect Competition," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 44(3), pages 511-518.
    6. Milgrom, Paul R & Weber, Robert J, 1982. "A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(5), pages 1089-1122, September.
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