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Âge, temps et normes : une analyse de la prescription pharmaceutique

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  • Pierre-Jean Lancry
  • Valérie Paris

Abstract

[fre] Âge, temps et normes : une analyse de la prescription pharmaceutique par Pierre- Jean Lancry et Valérie Paris . La mise en place de politiques cohérentes de régulation des dépenses de santé nécessite la définition de variables de commande susceptibles de modifier les comportements des différents acteurs (patients, producteurs de biens et services médicaux, assurance maladie et tutelle). Au sein de la consommation médicale ambulatoire, le médicament joue un rôle très important. Premier poste de dépenses, associé essentiellement à l'activité des médecins généralistes, il a été, depuis très longtemps, l'objet de mesures spécifiques. Dans ce travail, nous nous intéressons aux principaux déterminants de la prescription pharmaceutique. Nous présentons une analyse économétrique à partir de données sur l'offre et la pratique professionnelle (âge, sexe, activité, lieu de formation, lieu d'exercice, etc.), sur la demande (âge, sexe, taux de mortalité, etc.) et sur les conditions de marché (densité médicale, activité moyenne dans la commune, secteur conventionnel, etc.). [eng] Age, Time and Standards: An Analysis of the Pharmaceutical Prescription by Pierre- Jean Lancry and Valérie Paris . The introduction of coherent policies to control health spending requires definition of regulating variables likely to alter the behaviour of the various players (patients, producers of medical goods and services, health insurance bodies and supervisory authorities). Medicines play a very substantial part in outpatient medical consumption. As the largest item of expenditure, mainly associated with the work of general practitioners, they have long been the subject of special measures. . In this work we focus on the determining factors of the pharmaceutical prescription. Using data on supply and professional practice (age, gender, occupation, place of training, practice locality, etc.), demand (age, gender, mortality rate, etc.) and market conditions (doctor density, average workload in the district, officially recognised sector, etc.).

Suggested Citation

  • Pierre-Jean Lancry & Valérie Paris, 1997. "Âge, temps et normes : une analyse de la prescription pharmaceutique," Économie et Prévision, Programme National Persée, vol. 129(3), pages 173-187.
    • Handle: RePEc:prs:ecoprv:ecop_0249-4744_1997_num_129_3_5871
    DOI: 10.3406/ecop.1997.5871
    Note: DOI:10.3406/ecop.1997.5871
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