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Allocation du capital et chômage technologique d'exclusion

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  • Didier Blanchet

Abstract

[fre] Allocation du capital et chômage technologique d'exclusion, . par Didier Blanchet.. . Cet article examine un effet possible des changements technologiques sur l'emploi : si la maîtrise des nouvelles techniques est inégalement répartie dans la population, et s'il y a concurrence pour l'utilisation d'un capital rare, alors l'emploi des actifs les moins productifs implique un coût d'opportunité qui peut être supérieur à leur production apparente, conduisant à leur rejet du marché du travail. Ce résultat tient aussi bien dans un contexte d'optimisation centralisée que d'équilibre concurrentiel.Il correspond dans ce dernier cas à un phénomène de chômage involontaire, que la flexibilité des salaires ne permet pas d'éviter. On étudie rapidement l' application du modèle à diverses questions: exclusion du marché du travail liée à l' âge, partage du travail, politiques redistributrices compensatrices, débouchés offerts par des emplois alternatifs peu capitalistiques. [ger] Kapitalallokation und technisch bedingte Arbeitslosigkeit mit Verdrängung vom Arbeitsmarkt, . von Didier Blanchet.. . In diesem Artikel wird ein moglicher Effekt der technologischen Veränderungen auf die Beschäftigung untersucht. Wenn die Beherrschung der neuen Techniken in der Bevölkerang ungleich verteilt ist und wenn bei der Nutzung eines seltenen Kapitals Wettbewerb herrscht, verursacht die Beschäftigung der am wenigsten produktiven Erwerbstätigen Opportunitätskosten, die höher als deren offensichtliche Produktion sein können, was dann zu deren Verdrängung vom Arbeitsmarkt führt. Dieses Ergebnis paßt sowohl in einen Kontext der zentralisierten Optimierung als auch in einen Kontext des Wettbewerbsgleichgewichtes. Im letzteren Falle entspricht es einem Phänomen der unfreiwilligen Arbeitslosigkeit, die durch die Flexibilität der Löhne nicht vermieden werden kann. Untersucht wird kurz die Anwendung dieses Modells auf verschiedene Problemkreise, wie die Verdrängung vom Arbeitsmarkt aufgrund des Alters, die Arbeitsplatzteilung, die kompensatorischen Umverteilungspolitiken, die Berufsaussichten bei alternativen und wenig kapitalintensiven Arbeitsplätzen. [spa] Asignación del capital y paro técnico de exclusión, . por Didier Blanchet.. . Este artículo examina un efecto posible de los cambios tecnológicos sobre el empleo : si el dominio de las nuevas técnicas está repartido de manera desigual entre la población, y si hay competencia para la utilización de un capital raro, entonces el empleo de los activos menos productivos implica un coste de oportunidad que puede ser superior a su producción aparente, conduciendo a que se les descarte del mercado de trabajo. Este resultado encaja tanto dentro de un contexto de optimización centralizada como de equilibrio competitivo. Corresponde en este último caso a un fenómeno de paro involuntario, que la flexibilidad de los salarios no permite evitar. Se examina rúpidamente la aplicación del modelo a diversas cuestiones : exclusión del mercado del trabajo ligada a la edad, reparto del trabajo, políticas redistribuidoras compensadoras, salidas ofrecidas por empleos alternatives poco capitalísticos. [eng] Allocation of Capital and Technological Exclusion Unemployment, . by Didier Blanchet.. . This article examines a possible effect of technological changes on employment. If skills in new technologies are unevenly distributed across the population and if there is competition for the use of a rare capital, then the employment of the least-productive workers implies an opportunity cost that might be higher than their apparent production. This leads to their rejection from the labour market. This result holds true in both a context of centralized optimization and a context of competitive equilibrium. In the latter case, it corresponds to an involuntary unemployment phenomenon, which wage flexibility cannot prevent. The article then takes a brief look at applying the model to various issues: age-based exclusion from the labour market, work sharing, compensating redistributive policies, and the openings offered by alternative low-capital jobs.

Suggested Citation

  • Didier Blanchet, 1994. "Allocation du capital et chômage technologique d'exclusion," Économie et Prévision, Programme National Persée, vol. 115(4), pages 75-84.
  • Handle: RePEc:prs:ecoprv:ecop_0249-4744_1994_num_115_4_5686
    DOI: 10.3406/ecop.1994.5686
    Note: DOI:10.3406/ecop.1994.5686
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    4. Lazear, Edward P, 1979. "Why Is There Mandatory Retirement?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 87(6), pages 1261-1284, December.
    5. Patrick Sevestre, 1990. "Qualification de la main-d'oeuvre et productivité du travail," Économie et Statistique, Programme National Persée, vol. 237(1), pages 109-120.
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