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Salaire d'efficience et coopération entre insiders et outsiders

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  • Muriel Pucci

Abstract

[spa] Salario de efïciencia y cooperación entre insiders y outsiders, . por Muriel Pucci.. . Este artículo propone un nuevo fundamento a la relación de efïciencia que descansa en la distinción entre trabajadores en puesto (insiders) y postulantes (outsiders). Muestra que a la empresa le conviene proponer perfiles de salarios que crezcan con la antigüedad con el fin de incitar a los insiders, que han adquirido una cualificación específica, a capacitar a los que entran cuando el esfuerzo de formación individual es imperfectamente observable. Las condiciones en las cuales la capacitación interna con salario de efïciencia será escogida por la empresa se examinan suponiendo que puede, de manera alternativa, optar por una capacitación exterior de los trabajadores, o incluso utilizar ûnicamente trabajo no cualificado. [ger] Effizienzlohn und Zusammenarbeit zwischen I mid em und Outsidern, . von Muriel Pucd.. . In diesem Artikel wird eine neue Grundlage für die Effizienzbeziehung vorgeschlagen, die auf der Unterscheidung zwischen Arbeitnehmern mit einer Beschäftigung (Insidern) und Arbeitsuchenden (Outsidern) beruht. Es wird aufgezeigt, daß es im Interesse eines Unternehmens liegt, Lohnprofile anzubieten, die mit der Dauer der Betriebszugehörigkeit ansteigen, damit die Insider, die eine besondere Qualifikation erworben haben, einen Anreiz zum Anlernen neuer Arbeitskräfte erhalten, wenn die individuellen Ausbildungsbemühungen unvollkommen beobachtbar sind. Untersucht werden die Bedingungen, unter denen sich ein Untemehmen fur die betriebsinterne Ausbildung mit Effizienzlohn entscheidet. Hierbei wird davon ausgegangen, daß es als Alternative ebenfalls eine externe Ausbildung der Beschäftigten oder aber auch die Einstellung von ausschließlich unqualifizierten Arbeitskräften wählen kann. [eng] The Efficiency Wage and Co-operation between Insiders and Outsiders, . by Muriel Pucci.. . This article proposes a new basis for the efficiency ratio, drawing on the distinction between employees (insiders) and applicants (outsiders). It shows that firms should offer wage profiles that rise with seniority in order to encourage insiders, who have acquired specific skills, to train new employees when the individual training effort cannot be satisfactorily observed. A study is made of the conditions under which in-house training with an efficiency wage is chosen by the firm, presuming that the firm may opt for the alternative of external employee training or even use solely unskilled labour. [fre] Salaire d'efficience et coopération entre insiders et outsiders, . par Muriel Pucci.. . Cet article propose un nouveau fondement à la relation d'efficience qui repose sur la distinction entre travailleurs en poste (insiders) et postulants (outsiders). Il montre que l'entreprise a intérêt à proposer des profils de salaires croissant avec l'ancienneté afin d'inciter les insiders, qui ont acquis une qualification spécifique, à former les entrants lorsque l'effort de formation individuel est imparfaitement observable. Les conditions dans lesquelles la formation interne avec salaire d'efficience sera choisie par l'entreprise sont étudiées en supposant qu'elle peut, de façon alternative, opter pour une formation extérieure des travailleurs, ou encore utiliser uniquement du travail non qualifié.

Suggested Citation

  • Muriel Pucci, 1994. "Salaire d'efficience et coopération entre insiders et outsiders," Économie et Prévision, Programme National Persée, vol. 113(2), pages 21-37.
  • Handle: RePEc:prs:ecoprv:ecop_0249-4744_1994_num_113_2_5665
    DOI: 10.3406/ecop.1994.5665
    Note: DOI:10.3406/ecop.1994.5665
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    References listed on IDEAS

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