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Problém zastoupení v nové institucionální ekonomii
[The Agency Problem in New Institutional Economics]

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  • Tomáš Otáhal

Abstract

The aim of the paper is to set the agency problem into a broad context of New Institutional Economics with an emphasis on historical connections. In the first section, I explain the historical evolution of basic theoretical concepts like the theory of firm, the theory of market process and the theory of property rights. The second section is dedicated to the explanation of the general concept of agency problem extended with the problem of asymmetric information leading to adverse selection and the problem of moral hazard, in context of previous historical connections. In the last section, the author provides some suggestions for the further theoretical and empirical research.

Suggested Citation

  • Tomáš Otáhal, 2009. "Problém zastoupení v nové institucionální ekonomii [The Agency Problem in New Institutional Economics]," Politická ekonomie, Prague University of Economics and Business, vol. 2009(5), pages 677-695.
    • Handle: RePEc:prg:jnlpol:v:2009:y:2009:i:5:id:704:p:677-695
    DOI: 10.18267/j.polek.704
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    new institutional economics; asymmetric information; Moral hazard; Agency theory; adverse selection;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • B25 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - History of Economic Thought since 1925 - - - Historical; Institutional; Evolutionary; Austrian; Stockholm School
    • L20 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - General
    • L26 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Entrepreneurship
    • P11 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Planning, Coordination, and Reform
    • P14 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Property Rights

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