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The Principal-Agent Theory and its Influence on the Quality of Assurance Services
[Vliv vztahů zastoupení na kvalitu informací poskytovaných ověřovacími službami]

Author

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  • Michal Bobek

Abstract

The article deals with the principal-agent theory and its application on provision of the assurance services. It describes influence which the principal-agent theory might have on the quality of information provided by the assurance services. The article defines stakeholders and shareholders of a company and their role in relation to provision of the assurance services, and then briefly presents the principal-agent theory. The influence of the principal-agent theory on the assurance services is ultimately studied in two ways, based on whether the subject who ordered the service is the main user of the provided information, or not. The agency costs are analyzed taking into account the amount of materiality and the amount of differences which are mentioned in management letter.

Suggested Citation

  • Michal Bobek, 2014. "The Principal-Agent Theory and its Influence on the Quality of Assurance Services [Vliv vztahů zastoupení na kvalitu informací poskytovaných ověřovacími službami]," Český finanční a účetní časopis, Prague University of Economics and Business, vol. 2014(2), pages 52-68.
    • Handle: RePEc:prg:jnlcfu:v:2014:y:2014:i:2:id:394:p:52-68
    DOI: 10.18267/j.cfuc.394
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Principal-Agent Theory; Assurance Services; Audit; Materiality; Vztahy zastoupení; Ověřovací služby; Materialita;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G02 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Behavioral Finance: Underlying Principles
    • M41 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Accounting - - - Accounting

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