IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/plo/pone00/0259963.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

How collective reward structure impedes group decision making: An experimental study using the HoneyComb paradigm

Author

Listed:
  • Marie Ritter
  • Meng Wang
  • Johannes Pritz
  • Olaf Menssen
  • Margarete Boos

Abstract

This study investigates if and under which conditions humans are able to identify and follow the most advantageous leader who will them provide with the most resources. In an iterated economic game with the aim of earning monetary reward, 150 participants were asked to repeatedly choose one out of four leaders. Unbeknownst to participants, the leaders were computer-controlled and programmed to yield different expected payout values that participants had to infer from repeated interaction over 30 rounds. Additionally, participants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions: single, independent, or cohesion. The conditions were designed to investigate the ideal circumstances that lead to identifying the most advantageous leader: when participants are alone (single condition), in a group that lets individuals sample information about leaders independently (independent condition), or in a group that is rewarded for cohesive behavior (cohesion condition). Our results show that participants are generally able to identify the most advantageous leader. However, participants who were incentivized to act cohesively in a group were more likely to settle on a less advantageous leader. This suggests that cohesion might have a detrimental effect on group decision making. To test the validity of this finding, we explore possible explanations for this pattern, such as the length of exploration and exploitation phases, and present techniques to check for confounding factors in group experiments in order to identify or exclude them as alternative explanations. Finally, we show that the chosen reward structure of the game strongly affects the observed following behavior in the group and possibly occludes other effects. We conclude with a recommendation to carefully choose reward structures and evaluate possible alternative explanations in experimental group research that should further pursue the study of exploration/exploitation phases and the influence of group cohesion on group decision making as promising topics for further research.

Suggested Citation

  • Marie Ritter & Meng Wang & Johannes Pritz & Olaf Menssen & Margarete Boos, 2021. "How collective reward structure impedes group decision making: An experimental study using the HoneyComb paradigm," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 16(11), pages 1-20, November.
  • Handle: RePEc:plo:pone00:0259963
    DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0259963
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0259963
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article/file?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0259963&type=printable
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1371/journal.pone.0259963?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. John Tooby & Leda Cosmides & Michael E. Price, 2006. "Cognitive adaptations for n-person exchange: the evolutionary roots of organizational behavior," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 27(2-3), pages 103-129.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Varela-Neira, Concepción & Araujo, Marisa del Río & Sanmartín, Emilio Ruzo, 2018. "How and when a salesperson's perception of organizational politics relates to proactive performance," European Management Journal, Elsevier, vol. 36(5), pages 660-670.
    2. Dincer, Oguzhan C. & Fredriksson, Per G., 2018. "Corruption and environmental regulatory policy in the United States: Does trust matter?," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(C), pages 212-225.
    3. Anne C Pisor & Michael Gurven, 2015. "Corruption and the Other(s): Scope of Superordinate Identity Matters for Corruption Permissibility," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 10(12), pages 1-24, December.
    4. Han Xiao & Cheng Ma & Hongwei Gao & Ye Gao & Yang Xue, 2022. "Green Transformation of Anti-Epidemic Supplies in the Post-Pandemic Era: An Evolutionary Approach," IJERPH, MDPI, vol. 19(10), pages 1-26, May.
    5. Kyong-sun Jin & Fransisca Ting & Zijing He & Renée Baillargeon, 2024. "Infants expect some degree of positive and negative reciprocity between strangers," Nature Communications, Nature, vol. 15(1), pages 1-13, December.
    6. Arnaud Wolff, 2019. "On the Function of Beliefs in Strategic Social Interactions," Working Papers of BETA 2019-41, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
    7. Saad, Gad & Vongas, John G., 2009. "The effect of conspicuous consumption on men's testosterone levels," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 110(2), pages 80-92, November.
    8. Price, Michael E., 2006. "Judgments about cooperators and freeriders on a Shuar work team: An evolutionary psychological perspective," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 101(1), pages 20-35, September.
    9. Johnson, Dominic D.P. & Price, Michael E. & Van Vugt, Mark, 2013. "Darwin's invisible hand: Market competition, evolution and the firm," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 90(S), pages 128-140.
    10. Stefan Leenheer & Maurice Gesthuizen & Michael Savelkoul, 2021. "Two-Way, One-Way or Dead-End Streets? Financial and Social Causes and Consequences of Generalized Trust," Social Indicators Research: An International and Interdisciplinary Journal for Quality-of-Life Measurement, Springer, vol. 155(3), pages 915-937, June.
    11. Rusch, Hannes, 2018. "Ancestral kinship patterns substantially reduce the negative effect of increasing group size on incentives for public goods provision," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 64(C), pages 105-115.
    12. Benito Arruñada & Xosé H. Vázquez, 2009. "Behavioral assumptions and management ability," Economics Working Papers 1157, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Apr 2010.
    13. Nicolas Baumard, 2010. "Has punishment played a role in the evolution of cooperation? A critical review," Mind & Society: Cognitive Studies in Economics and Social Sciences, Springer;Fondazione Rosselli, vol. 9(2), pages 171-192, December.
    14. Zachary Garfield & Kristen Syme & Edward H. Hagen, 2020. "Universal and variable leadership dimensions across human societies," Post-Print hal-03162384, HAL.
    15. David Pietraszewski & Leda Cosmides & John Tooby, 2014. "The Content of Our Cooperation, Not the Color of Our Skin: An Alliance Detection System Regulates Categorization by Coalition and Race, but Not Sex," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 9(2), pages 1-19, February.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:plo:pone00:0259963. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: plosone (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://journals.plos.org/plosone/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.