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Justine Effect: Punishment of the Unduly Self-Sacrificing Cooperative Individuals

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  • Aleš Antonín Kuběna
  • Petr Houdek
  • Jitka Lindová
  • Lenka Příplatová
  • Jaroslav Flegr

Abstract

Background: Allowing players to punish their opponents in Public Goods Game sustains cooperation within a group and thus brings advantage to the cooperative individuals. However, the possibility of punishment of the co-players can result in antisocial punishment, the punishment of those players who contribute the most in the group. To better understand why antisocial punishment exists, it must be determined who are the anti-social punishers and who are their primary targets. Methods: For resolving these questions we increased the number of players in a group from usual four to twelve. Each group played six rounds of the standard Public Goods Game and six rounds of the Public Goods Game with punishment. Each player in each round received 20 CZK ($ 1.25). Players (N = 118) were rematched after each round so that they would not take into consideration opponents' past behavior. Results: The amount of the punishment received correlated negatively with the contribution (ρ = −0.665, p

Suggested Citation

  • Aleš Antonín Kuběna & Petr Houdek & Jitka Lindová & Lenka Příplatová & Jaroslav Flegr, 2014. "Justine Effect: Punishment of the Unduly Self-Sacrificing Cooperative Individuals," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 9(3), pages 1-8, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:plo:pone00:0092336
    DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0092336
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Ernst Fehr & Simon Gächter, 2002. "Altruistic punishment in humans," Nature, Nature, vol. 415(6868), pages 137-140, January.
    2. Nikos Nikiforakis & Hans-Theo Normann, 2008. "A comparative statics analysis of punishment in public-good experiments," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 11(4), pages 358-369, December.
    3. Simon Gachter & Ernst Fehr, 2000. "Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(4), pages 980-994, September.
    4. Ananish Chaudhuri, 2011. "Sustaining cooperation in laboratory public goods experiments: a selective survey of the literature," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 14(1), pages 47-83, March.
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    1. Qian, Jun & Zhang, Tongda & Zhang, Yingfeng & Chai, Yueting & Sun, Xiao & Wang, Zhen, 2023. "The construction of peer punishment preference: how central power shapes prosocial and antisocial punishment behaviors," Applied Mathematics and Computation, Elsevier, vol. 442(C).

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