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Sex Is Always Well Worth Its Two-Fold Cost

Author

Listed:
  • Alexander Feigel
  • Avraham Englander
  • Assaf Engel

Abstract

Sex is considered as an evolutionary paradox, since its positive contribution to Darwinian fitness remains unverified for some species. Defenses against unpredictable threats (parasites, fluctuating environment and deleterious mutations) are indeed significantly improved by wider genetic variability and by positive epistasis gained by sexual reproduction. The corresponding evolutionary advantages, however, do not overcome universally the barrier of the two-fold cost for sharing half of one's offspring genome with another member of the population. Here we show that sexual reproduction emerges and is maintained even when its Darwinian fitness is twice as low as the fitness of asexuals. We also show that more than two sexes (inheritance of genetic material from three or even more parents) are always evolutionary unstable. Our approach generalizes the evolutionary game theory to analyze species whose members are able to sense the sexual state of their conspecifics and to adapt their own sex consequently, either by switching or by taxis towards the highest concentration of the complementary sex. The widespread emergence and maintenance of sex follows therefore from its co-evolution with the even more widespread environmental sensing abilities.

Suggested Citation

  • Alexander Feigel & Avraham Englander & Assaf Engel, 2009. "Sex Is Always Well Worth Its Two-Fold Cost," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 4(7), pages 1-6, July.
  • Handle: RePEc:plo:pone00:0006012
    DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0006012
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    2. Erika Check Hayden, 2008. "Evolution: Scandal! Sex-starved and still surviving," Nature, Nature, vol. 452(7188), pages 678-680, April.
    3. Theodore C. Bergstrom, 2003. "The Algebra of Assortative Encounters and the Evolution of Cooperation," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 5(03), pages 211-228.
    4. Nick Colegrave, 2002. "Sex releases the speed limit on evolution," Nature, Nature, vol. 420(6916), pages 664-666, December.
    5. Joel R. Peck & David Waxman, 2000. "Mutation and sex in a competitive world," Nature, Nature, vol. 406(6794), pages 399-404, July.
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