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A voluntary use of insecticide treated nets can stop the vector transmission of Chagas disease

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  • Cheol Yong Han
  • Habeeb Issa
  • Jan Rychtář
  • Dewey Taylor
  • Nancy Umana

Abstract

One of the stated goals of the London Declaration on Neglected Tropical Diseases is the interruption of domiciliary transmissions of Chagas disease in the region of the Americas. We used a game-theoretic approach to assess the voluntary use of insecticide treated nets (ITNs) in the prevention of the spread of infection through vector bites. Our results show that individuals behave rationally and weigh the risks of insect bites against the cost of the ITNs. The optimal voluntary use of ITNs results in predicted incidence rates that closely track the real incidence rates in Latin America. This means that ITNs are effective and could be used to control the spread of the disease by relying on individual decisions rather than centralized policies. Our model shows that to completely eradicate the vector transmission through the voluntary individual use of ITNs, the cost of ITNs should be as low as possible.Authors summary: We construct a game-theoretic model of individual use of insecticide treated nets (ITNs) to prevent the vector transmission of Chagas disease within the household.

Suggested Citation

  • Cheol Yong Han & Habeeb Issa & Jan Rychtář & Dewey Taylor & Nancy Umana, 2020. "A voluntary use of insecticide treated nets can stop the vector transmission of Chagas disease," PLOS Neglected Tropical Diseases, Public Library of Science, vol. 14(11), pages 1-19, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:plo:pntd00:0008833
    DOI: 10.1371/journal.pntd.0008833
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Eric Maskin, 1999. "Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 66(1), pages 23-38.
    2. Rick L Tarleton & Richard Reithinger & Julio A Urbina & Uriel Kitron & Ricardo E Gürtler, 2007. "The Challenges of Chagas Disease— Grim Outlook or Glimmer of Hope?," PLOS Medicine, Public Library of Science, vol. 4(12), pages 1-6, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Kristen Scheckelhoff & Ayesha Ejaz & Igor V. Erovenko & Jan Rychtář & Dewey Taylor, 2021. "Optimal Voluntary Vaccination of Adults and Adolescents Can Help Eradicate Hepatitis B in China," Games, MDPI, vol. 12(4), pages 1-13, October.
    2. Jabili Angina & Anish Bachhu & Eesha Talati & Rishi Talati & Jan Rychtář & Dewey Taylor, 2022. "Game-Theoretical Model of the Voluntary Use of Insect Repellents to Prevent Zika Fever," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 12(1), pages 133-146, March.
    3. Jovic Aaron S. Caasi & Brian M. Joseph & Heera J. Kodiyamplakkal & Jaelene Renae U. Manibusan & Leslie J. Camacho Aquino & Hyunju Oh & Jan Rychtář & Dewey Taylor, 2022. "A Game-Theoretic Model of Voluntary Yellow Fever Vaccination to Prevent Urban Outbreaks," Games, MDPI, vol. 13(4), pages 1-14, August.

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