IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/pid/journl/v49y2010i4p405-417.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

The Effect of Corruption and Governance on Tax Revenues

Author

Listed:
  • Tahseen Ajaz

    (University of Wah, Wah Cant)

  • Eatzaz Ahmad

    (, Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad)

Abstract

Developing countries face a number of institutional problems in the process of revenue generation. One of the main problems is the corruption in tax administration. The second main problem of low revenue generation is the low quality of governance. This study analyses the effect of institutional and structural variables (corruption and governance) on tax revenues using a panel data set for 25 developing countries over the period 1990-2005. The GMM regression results show that corruption has an adverse effect on tax collection, while good governance contributes to better performance in tax collection. It is further observed that institutional variables have a significant effect on tax revenues.

Suggested Citation

  • Tahseen Ajaz & Eatzaz Ahmad, 2010. "The Effect of Corruption and Governance on Tax Revenues," The Pakistan Development Review, Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, vol. 49(4), pages 405-417.
    • Handle: RePEc:pid:journl:v:49:y:2010:i:4:p:405-417
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.pide.org.pk/pdf/PDR/2010/Volume4/405-417.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Chand, Sheetal K. & Moene, Karl O., 1999. "Controlling Fiscal Corruption," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 27(7), pages 1129-1140, July.
    2. Joshua Aizenman & Yothin Jinjarak, 2008. "The collection efficiency of the Value Added Tax: Theory and international evidence," The Journal of International Trade & Economic Development, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 17(3), pages 391-410.
    3. Howell H Zee & Vito Tanzi, 2001. "Tax Policy for Developing Countries," IMF Economic Issues 27, International Monetary Fund.
    4. Richard M. Bird & Jorge Martinez-Vazquez & Benno Torgler, 2014. "Societal Institutions and Tax Effort in Developing Countries," Annals of Economics and Finance, Society for AEF, vol. 15(1), pages 301-351, May.
    5. Dani Rodrik, 1998. "Why Do More Open Economies Have Bigger Governments?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 106(5), pages 997-1032, October.
    6. Tanzi, Vito, 1999. "Uses and Abuses of Estimates of the Underground Economy," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 109(456), pages 338-347, June.
    7. Imam Patrick Amir & Jacobs Davina, 2014. "Effect of Corruption on Tax Revenues in the Middle East," Review of Middle East Economics and Finance, De Gruyter, vol. 10(1), pages 1-24, April.
    8. Mr. John Thornton & Fabian Bornhorst & Mr. Sanjeev Gupta, 2008. "Natural Resource Endowments, Governance, and the Domestic Revenue Effort: Evidence from a Panel of Countries," IMF Working Papers 2008/170, International Monetary Fund.
    9. World Bank, 2006. "World Development Indicators 2006," World Bank Publications - Books, The World Bank Group, number 8151.
    10. Fjeldstad, Odd-Helge & Tungodden, Bertil, 2003. "Fiscal Corruption: A Vice or a Virtue?," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 31(8), pages 1459-1467, August.
    11. Odd-Helge Fjeldstad, 2006. "Corruption in Tax Administration: Lessons from Institutional Reforms in Uganda," Chapters, in: Susan Rose-Ackerman (ed.), International Handbook on the Economics of Corruption, chapter 17, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    12. Bird, Richard M. & Zolt, Eric M., 2008. "Technology and Taxation in Developing Countries: From Hand to Mouse," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association;National Tax Journal, vol. 61(4), pages 791-821, December.
    13. Mr. Vito Tanzi & Mr. Howell H Zee, 2001. "Tax Policy for Developing Countries," IMF Economic Issues 2001/001, International Monetary Fund.
    14. Sanyal, Amal & Gang, Ira N & Goswami, Omkar, 2000. "Corruption, Tax Evasion and the Laffer Curve," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 105(1-2), pages 61-78, October.
    15. Allingham, Michael G. & Sandmo, Agnar, 1972. "Income tax evasion: a theoretical analysis," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(3-4), pages 323-338, November.
    16. Tanzi, Vito & Zee, Howell H., 2000. "Tax Policy for Emerging Markets: Developing Countries," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association;National Tax Journal, vol. 53(2), pages 299-322, June.
    17. Mr. John D Brondolo & Frank Bosch & Mr. Eric Le Borgne & Mr. Carlos Silvani, 2008. "Tax Administration Reform and Fiscal Adjustment: The Case of Indonesia (2001-07)," IMF Working Papers 2008/129, International Monetary Fund.
    18. Richard M. Bird & Jorge Martinez-Vazquez & Benno Torgler, 2014. "Societal Institutions and Tax Effort in Developing Countries," Annals of Economics and Finance, Society for AEF, vol. 15(1), pages 301-351, May.
    19. Alm, James & Bahl, Roy & Murray, Matthew N, 1991. "Tax Base Erosion in Developing Countries," Economic Development and Cultural Change, University of Chicago Press, vol. 39(4), pages 849-872, July.
    20. Vito Tanzi, 1998. "Corruption Around the World: Causes, Consequences, Scope, and Cures," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 45(4), pages 559-594, December.
    21. Antonio Acconcia & Marcello D'Amato & Riccardo Martina, 2003. "Tax Evasion and Corruption in Tax Administration," Public Economics 0310001, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    22. Mr. Vito Tanzi, 1998. "Corruption Around the World: Causes, Consequences, Scope, and Cures," IMF Working Papers 1998/063, International Monetary Fund.
    23. Besley, Timothy & McLaren, John, 1993. "Taxes and Bribery: The Role of Wage Incentives," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 103(416), pages 119-141, January.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Manamba Epaphra, & John Massawe,, 2017. "Corruption, governance and tax revenues in Africa," Business and Economic Horizons (BEH), Prague Development Center, vol. 13(4), pages 439-467, October.
    2. Siongofolo Seydou Soro, 2020. "Institutional Quality and Tax Revenue in C te d Ivoire: Evidence from ARDL Approach," International Journal of Economics and Financial Issues, Econjournals, vol. 10(6), pages 40-49.
    3. Godin, M. & Hindriks, J., 2015. "A Review of Critical Issues on Tax Design and Tax Administration in a Global Economy and Developing Countries," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2015028, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    4. Makmun Syadullah, 2015. "Governance and Tax Revenue in Asean Countries," Journal of Social and Development Sciences, AMH International, vol. 6(2), pages 76-88.
    5. James Alm & Jorge Martinez-Vazquez, 2007. "Tax Morale and Tax Evasion in Latin America," International Center for Public Policy Working Paper Series, at AYSPS, GSU paper0704, International Center for Public Policy, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University.
    6. Margaret Levi & Audrey Sacks, 2009. "Legitimating beliefs: Sources and indicators," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 3(4), pages 311-333, December.
    7. repec:idq:ictduk:13711 is not listed on IDEAS
    8. Roy Cerqueti & Raffaella Coppier, 2015. "Corruptibility and tax evasion," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 39(2), pages 355-373, April.
    9. Fjeldstad, Odd-Helge, 2013. "Taxation and Development : A Review of Donor Support to Strengthen Tax Systems in Developing Countries," WIDER Working Paper Series 010, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
    10. Yawovi Mawussé Isaac Amedanou, 2021. "Politics, Institutions and Tax Revenue Mobilization in West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) Countries," CERDI Working papers hal-03255316, HAL.
    11. Yawovi Mawussé Isaac Amedanou, 2021. "Politics, Institutions and Tax Revenue Mobilization in West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) Countries," Working Papers hal-03255316, HAL.
    12. Cerqueti, Roy & Coppier, Raffaella, 2009. "Tax revenues, fiscal corruption and "shame" costs," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 26(6), pages 1239-1244, November.
    13. Lien, Nguyen Phuong, 2015. "The impact of institutional quality on tax revenue in developing countries," Asian Journal of Empirical Research, Asian Economic and Social Society, vol. 5(10), pages 181-195, October.
    14. Yaru, Mohammed Aminu & Raji, Ajibola Simbiat, 2021. "Corruption, Governance and Tax Revenue Performance in Sub-Saharan Africa," African Journal of Economic Review, African Journal of Economic Review, vol. 10(1), December.
    15. Mr. Paulo Drummond & Mr. Wendell Daal & Mr. Nandini Srivastava & Mr. Luiz E Oliveira, 2012. "Mobilizing Revenue in Sub-Saharan Africa: Empirical Norms and Key Determinants," IMF Working Papers 2012/108, International Monetary Fund.
    16. Leanora Alecia Brown & Jorge Martinez-Vazquez, 2015. "International Debt Forgiveness: Who Gets Picked and Its Effect On The Tax Effort Of Developing Countries," International Center for Public Policy Working Paper Series, at AYSPS, GSU paper1504, International Center for Public Policy, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University.
    17. Blackburn, Keith & Forgues-Puccio, Gonzalo F., 2009. "Why is corruption less harmful in some countries than in others?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 72(3), pages 797-810, December.
    18. Axel Dreher & Christos Kotsogiannis & Steve McCorriston, 2009. "How do institutions affect corruption and the shadow economy?," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 16(6), pages 773-796, December.
    19. Günther G. Schulze & Bambang Suharnoko Sjahrir & Nikita Zakharov, 2016. "Corruption in Russia," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 59(1), pages 135-171.
    20. Fadi Alasfour, 2019. "Costs of Distrust: The Virtuous Cycle of Tax Compliance in Jordan," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 155(1), pages 243-258, March.
    21. Gauthier, Bernard & Goyette, Jonathan & Kouamé, Wilfried A.K., 2021. "Why do firms pay bribes? Evidence on the demand and supply sides of corruption in developing countries," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 190(C), pages 463-479.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Public Economics;

    JEL classification:

    • H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion and Avoidance

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pid:journl:v:49:y:2010:i:4:p:405-417. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Khurram Iqbal (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/pideipk.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.