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Deficit Limits and Fiscal Rules for Dummies

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  • Paolo Manasse

Abstract

The paper shows that common fiscal rules, such as a limit to the deficit-output ratio, induce an “escape clause”–type fiscal policy, similar to that studied for monetary policy by Flood and Isard (1988 and 1989) and Lohmann (1992): The government resorts to an active stabilization (for example, countercyclical) policy only during “exceptional times” by running deficits in recession phases and surpluses during economic booms. In contrast, it optimally chooses a procyclical policy in intermediate states of the economy, for example, by raising the budget deficit when output improves. Because the optimal fiscal reaction function in the presence of fiscal rules is not monotonous in output, the standard estimates that assume linearity are prone to a serious bias, and the conclusions on the pro- or countercyclical properties of fiscal policy found in the literature are likely to be unreliable. IMF Staff Papers (2007) 54, 455–473. doi:10.1057/palgrave.imfsp.9450015

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  • Paolo Manasse, 2007. "Deficit Limits and Fiscal Rules for Dummies," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 54(3), pages 455-473, July.
  • Handle: RePEc:pal:imfstp:v:54:y:2007:i:3:p:455-473
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    2. Carmignani, Fabrizio, 2010. "Cyclical fiscal policy in Africa," Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, vol. 32(2), pages 254-267, March.
    3. Pinaki Chakraborty, 2017. "Federalism, fiscal space, and public investment spending: do fiscal rules impose hard-budget constraints?," Chapters, in: Naoyuki Yoshino & Peter J. Morgan (ed.), Central and Local Government Relations in Asia, chapter 3, pages 103-129, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    4. W. D. Gregori, 2014. "Fiscal Rules and Public Spending: Evidence from Italian Municipalities," Working Papers wp923, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
    5. Fabrizio Carmignani, "undated". "Cyclical fiscal policy in developing countries: the case of Africa," MRG Discussion Paper Series 2408, School of Economics, University of Queensland, Australia.
    6. L. Marattin & S. Meraglia, 2016. "Potential Output and Fiscal Rules in a Monetary Union under Asymmetric Information 2nd ed," Working Papers wp1063, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
    7. Étienne Farvaque & Martial Foucault & Marcelin Joanis, 2015. "L’endettement public des provinces canadiennes : Les règles d’équilibre budgétaire sont-elles efficaces?," CIRANO Working Papers 2015s-10, CIRANO.
    8. L. Marattin & S. Meraglia, 2015. "Potential Output and Fiscal Rules in a Monetary Union under Asymmetric Information," Working Papers wp1018, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
    9. Hayal Ayça ŞİMŞEK & Ayşe GÜNAY BEKÂR, 2008. "The Effects of Fiscal Policy Rules on Fiscal Balance: The Perspectives on Turkish Economy," Sosyoekonomi Journal, Sosyoekonomi Society, issue 2008-2.
    10. Caselli, Francesca & Wingender, Philippe, 2021. "Heterogeneous effects of fiscal rules: The Maastricht fiscal criterion and the counterfactual distribution of government deficits✰," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 136(C).
    11. Luigi Marattin & Simone Meraglia & Raoul Minetti, 2022. "Sovereign bail‐outs and fiscal rules in a banking union," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 124(4), pages 1024-1055, October.
    12. Farvaque, Étienne & Foucault, Martial & Joanis, Marcelin, 2012. "Les règles budgétaires dans les provinces canadiennes : nomenclatures et éléments d’analyse," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 88(3), pages 281-315, Septembre.
    13. Francesca Caselli & Mr. Philippe Wingender, 2018. "Bunching at 3 Percent: The Maastricht Fiscal Criterion and Government Deficits," IMF Working Papers 2018/182, International Monetary Fund.

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