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Exploring the causes and consequences of director overboardedness in an emerging market

Author

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  • Nadia Mans-Kemp

    (Stellenbosch University)

  • Suzette Viviers

    (Stellenbosch University)

  • Sian Collins

    (Stellenbosch University)

Abstract

Scholars and shareholder activists have raised concerns about directors serving on multiple boards simultaneously. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with 10 experienced diverse South African directors to investigate the causes and consequences of overboardedness. Interviewees identified the limited talent pool and board diversity targets as the main causes of overboardedness (or interlocking as it is also called). In line with the busyness hypothesis, poor meeting attendance by overboarded directors was highlighted by some participants. However, others claimed that director interlocking could offer invaluable access to social networks and resources, lending support to the experience hypothesis. Director busyness should hence be considered on a case-by-case basis.

Suggested Citation

  • Nadia Mans-Kemp & Suzette Viviers & Sian Collins, 2018. "Exploring the causes and consequences of director overboardedness in an emerging market," International Journal of Disclosure and Governance, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 15(4), pages 210-220, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:pal:ijodag:v:15:y:2018:i:4:d:10.1057_s41310-018-0048-9
    DOI: 10.1057/s41310-018-0048-9
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    Cited by:

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    3. Mosammet Asma Jahan & Martien Lubberink & Karen Van Peursem, 2021. "Does prestigious board membership matter? Evidence from New Zealand," Accounting and Finance, Accounting and Finance Association of Australia and New Zealand, vol. 61(1), pages 977-1015, March.
    4. Nailesh Limbasiya & Hitesh Shukla, 2019. "Effect of Board Diversity, Promoter’s Presence and Multiple Directorships on Firm Performance," Indian Journal of Corporate Governance, , vol. 12(2), pages 169-186, December.

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