IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/pal/easeco/v47y2021i4d10.1057_s41302-021-00204-9.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Do Governors Lead or Follow? Timing of Stay-at-Home Orders

Author

Listed:
  • Bryan C. McCannon

    (West Virginia University)

Abstract

I investigate the timing of the Stay-at-Home orders. I use daily Google search data to track early interest in the novel Coronavirus pandemic. I ask whether governors responded to heightened concern (i.e., following) or if their decisions are independent of citizen sentiment (i.e., leading). I show that Stay-at-Home orders were initiated sooner in states that saw early, heightened in the virus. This suggests that governors follow voters’ opinions, preferences, and sentiments. Exploring potential heterogeneous effects, there is not a difference in the size of this effect between Republican and Democrat governors, nor is there a difference between those up for re-election in 2020 and those not. I do find that governor responsiveness is related to the state’s economic freedom and the governor’s approval rating just before the pandemic. In a novel environment without precedence, governors in the USA set policy in accord with voter preferences.

Suggested Citation

  • Bryan C. McCannon, 2021. "Do Governors Lead or Follow? Timing of Stay-at-Home Orders," Eastern Economic Journal, Palgrave Macmillan;Eastern Economic Association, vol. 47(4), pages 506-518, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:pal:easeco:v:47:y:2021:i:4:d:10.1057_s41302-021-00204-9
    DOI: 10.1057/s41302-021-00204-9
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://link.springer.com/10.1057/s41302-021-00204-9
    File Function: Abstract
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1057/s41302-021-00204-9?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Timothy Besley & Stephen Coate, 1997. "An Economic Model of Representative Democracy," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 112(1), pages 85-114.
    2. Lowry, Robert C. & Alt, James E. & Ferree, Karen E., 1998. "Fiscal Policy Outcomes and Electoral Accountability in American States," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 92(4), pages 759-774, December.
    3. John M. Barrios & Yael Hochberg, 2020. "Risk Perception Through the Lens of Politics in the Time of the COVID-19 Pandemic," NBER Working Papers 27008, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Martin J. Osborne & Al Slivinski, 1996. "A Model of Political Competition with Citizen-Candidates," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 111(1), pages 65-96.
    5. Allcott, Hunt & Boxell, Levi & Conway, Jacob & Gentzkow, Matthew & Thaler, Michael & Yang, David, 2020. "Polarization and public health: Partisan differences in social distancing during the coronavirus pandemic," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 191(C).
    6. Biglaiser, Gary & Mezzetti, Claudio, 1997. "Politicians' decision making with re-election concerns," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(3), pages 425-447, December.
    7. Anthony Downs, 1957. "An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 65(2), pages 135-135.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Elhadad, Sharon & Sommer, Udi, 2022. "Policy diffusion in federal systems during a state of emergency: diffusion of COVID-19 statewide lockdown policies across the United States," Studia z Polityki Publicznej / Public Policy Studies, Warsaw School of Economics, vol. 9(1), pages 1-28, May.
    2. Alexandre Olbrecht, 2021. "Human Suffering and Natural Experiments: How Empirical Economics can unmask the devastation of Covid-19," Eastern Economic Journal, Palgrave Macmillan;Eastern Economic Association, vol. 47(4), pages 461-463, October.
    3. Vincent Miozzi & Benjamin Powell, 2023. "The pre-pandemic political economy determinants of lockdown severity," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 197(1), pages 167-183, October.
    4. Vincent J. Miozzi & Benjamin Powell, 2023. "US state‐level economic freedom during the COVID‐19 pandemic," American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 82(4), pages 349-364, July.
    5. Bryan C. McCannon & Mark Wilson, 2023. "Mask Mandates Increased COVID-19 Deaths in Kansas," Journal of Private Enterprise, The Association of Private Enterprise Education, vol. 38(Winter 20), pages 29-54.
    6. Vincent Miozzi & Benjamin Powell, 2024. "The Evolution of US State Economic Freedom during the Pandemic’s Second Year," Journal of Private Enterprise, The Association of Private Enterprise Education, vol. 39(Summer 20), pages 9-29.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Per G. Fredriksson & Le Wang & Patrick L Warren, 2013. "Party Politics, Governors, and Economic Policy," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 80(1), pages 106-126, July.
    2. Gonzalez-Eiras, Martín & Niepelt, Dirk, 2022. "The political economy of early COVID-19 interventions in US states," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 140(C).
    3. Eva Mörk & Mattias Nordin, 2020. "Voting, taxes, and heterogeneous preferences: Evidence from Swedish local elections," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 32(3), pages 356-380, November.
    4. Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 2002. "Political economics and public finance," Handbook of Public Economics, in: A. J. Auerbach & M. Feldstein (ed.), Handbook of Public Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 24, pages 1549-1659, Elsevier.
    5. Kaivan Munshi & Mark Rosenzweig, 2008. "The Efficacy of Parochial Politics: Caste, Commitment, and Competence in Indian Local Governments," NBER Working Papers 14335, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. Francisco Martínez-Mora & M. Socorro Puy, 2009. "Off-the-peak preferences over government size," Working Papers 2009-9, Universidad de Málaga, Department of Economic Theory, Málaga Economic Theory Research Center.
    7. Thomas Braendle & Alois Stutzer, 2017. "Voters and Representatives: How Should Representatives Be Selected?," CREMA Working Paper Series 2017-05, Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA).
    8. Mattozzi, Andrea & Snowberg, Erik, 2018. "The right type of legislator: A theory of taxation and representation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 159(C), pages 54-65.
    9. Benoît Le Maux, 2009. "Governmental behavior in representative democracy: a synthesis of the theoretical literature," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 141(3), pages 447-465, December.
    10. Jose Garcia-Louzao & Ruben Perez-Sanz, 2024. "Women’s Voice at Work and Family-Friendly Firms," Bank of Lithuania Working Paper Series 120, Bank of Lithuania.
    11. Pande, Rohini, 2008. "Understanding Political Corruption in Low Income Countries," Handbook of Development Economics, in: T. Paul Schultz & John A. Strauss (ed.), Handbook of Development Economics, edition 1, volume 4, chapter 50, pages 3155-3184, Elsevier.
    12. César Martinelli & John Duggan, 2014. "The Political Economy of Dynamic Elections: A Survey and Some New Results," Working Papers 1403, Centro de Investigacion Economica, ITAM.
    13. Hoffman, Mitchell & León, Gianmarco & Lombardi, María, 2017. "Compulsory voting, turnout, and government spending: Evidence from Austria," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 145(C), pages 103-115.
    14. Martínez-Mora, Francisco & Puy, M. Socorro, 2014. "The determinants and electoral consequences of asymmetric preferences," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 33(C), pages 85-97.
    15. Braendle, Thomas, 2013. "Do Institutions Affect Citizens' Selection into Politics?," Working papers 2013/04, Faculty of Business and Economics - University of Basel.
    16. Lahoti, Rahul & Sahoo, Soham, 2020. "Are educated leaders good for education? Evidence from India," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 176(C), pages 42-62.
    17. Katsuya Kobayashi & Hideo Konishi, 2016. "Endogenous party structure," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 17(4), pages 317-351, November.
    18. Elinder, Mikael & Jordahl, Henrik, 2013. "Political preferences and public sector outsourcing," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 30(C), pages 43-57.
    19. Frank Page Jr & Myrna Wooders, 2003. "Elections and strategic positioning games," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 8(1), pages 63-83, August.
    20. Eguia, Jon X. & Giovannoni, Francesco, 2019. "Tactical Extremism," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 113(1), pages 282-286, February.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pal:easeco:v:47:y:2021:i:4:d:10.1057_s41302-021-00204-9. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.palgrave-journals.com/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.