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IMF’s Surcharges as a Threat to the Right to Development

Author

Listed:
  • Juan Pablo Bohoslavsky

    (UNRN CIEDIS (Interdisciplinary Centre on Rights, Inclusion and Society Studies, Universidad Nacional de Río Negro))

  • Francisco Cantamutto

    (Universidad Nacional del Sur (UNS)-CONICET)

  • Laura Clérico

    (UNRN CIEDIS (Interdisciplinary Centre on Rights, Inclusion and Society Studies, Universidad Nacional de Río Negro)
    Professor of Constitutional Law (University of Buenos Aires), Comparative Constitutional and Human Rights Law, Friedrich Alexander University)

Abstract

This article focuses on the implications of the IMF’s surcharges policies, jointly with its de facto preferred creditor status, on the right to sustainable development of sovereign borrowers. The article argues that, while surcharges are not effective in limiting access to IMF credit, they inequitably distribute the IMF’s operating costs, are disproportionate, pro-cyclical, very costly for developing countries, and non-transparent. Furthermore, if surcharges are theoretically a way to protect the IMF from potential risks of default, the article questions the IMF’s de facto preferred creditor status, as it precisely denies the possibility of granting debt relief in case of insolvency, ultimately affecting the right to development of —mainly— middle-income borrowing countries.

Suggested Citation

  • Juan Pablo Bohoslavsky & Francisco Cantamutto & Laura Clérico, 2022. "IMF’s Surcharges as a Threat to the Right to Development," Development, Palgrave Macmillan;Society for International Deveopment, vol. 65(2), pages 194-202, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:pal:develp:v:65:y:2022:i:2:d:10.1057_s41301-022-00340-5
    DOI: 10.1057/s41301-022-00340-5
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Cordella, Tito & Powell, Andrew, 2021. "Preferred and non-preferred creditors," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 132(C).
    2. Roubini, Nouriel & Brad Setser, 2004. "Bailouts or Bail-ins? Responding to Financial Crises in Emerging Economies," Peterson Institute Press: All Books, Peterson Institute for International Economics, number 378, April.
    3. Krahnke, Tobias, 2020. "Doing more with less: The catalytic function of IMF lending and the role of program size," Discussion Papers 18/2020, Deutsche Bundesbank.
    4. Anne Oeking & Mariusz A. Sumlinski, 2016. "Arrears to the IMF – A Ghost of the Past?," IMF Working Papers 2016/225, International Monetary Fund.
    5. Raffer Kunibert, 2016. "Rethinking Sovereign Debt: Pleading for Human Rights, the Rule of Law, and Economic Sense," Accounting, Economics, and Law: A Convivium, De Gruyter, vol. 6(3), pages 243-262, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Oliver Pahnecke & Juan Pablo Bohoslavsky, 2022. "Re-regulating the Risk Premium to Realize the Right to Development," Development, Palgrave Macmillan;Society for International Deveopment, vol. 65(2), pages 145-152, December.

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