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Unemployment Insurance Schemes, Liquidity Constraints and Re-employment: A Three Country Comparison

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  • Lorenzo Corsini

    (Department of Economics, University of Pisa, Via C. Ridolfi, 10, Pisa 56124, Italy.)

Abstract

We examine how unemployment schemes and liquidity constraints affect re-employment probabilities trying to assess whether these schemes, through employment services and search requirements, can offset the perverse effect of benefits on unemployment duration. Similarly, given that liquidity constraints and financial pressure also affect reservation wage and search effort, we analyze whether better economic conditions of individuals increase duration. We perform a survival analysis on Finland, Italy and Poland and we find that unemployment insurance schemes have a mixed effect: initially they give incentives to increase search effort but with time they simply reduce liquidity constraints and thus increase duration. We also find that individuals’ liquidity constraints reduce unemployment duration in Italy and Poland but not Finland, suggesting that this aspect is less important in countries with a more developed welfare system.

Suggested Citation

  • Lorenzo Corsini, 2012. "Unemployment Insurance Schemes, Liquidity Constraints and Re-employment: A Three Country Comparison," Comparative Economic Studies, Palgrave Macmillan;Association for Comparative Economic Studies, vol. 54(2), pages 321-340, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:pal:compes:v:54:y:2012:i:2:p:321-340
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Josef C Brada & Marcello Signorelli, 2012. "Comparing Labor Market Performance: Some Stylized Facts and Key Findings," Comparative Economic Studies, Palgrave Macmillan;Association for Comparative Economic Studies, vol. 54(2), pages 231-250, June.
    2. Gerards, Ruud & Welters, Riccardo, 2022. "Job search in the presence of a stressor: Does financial hardship change the effectiveness of job search?," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 90(C).
    3. Ruud Gerards & Riccardo Welters, 2020. "Liquidity Constraints, Unemployed Job Search and Labour Market Outcomes," Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, Department of Economics, University of Oxford, vol. 82(3), pages 625-646, June.
    4. Enrico Marelli & Misbah T. Choudhry & Marcello Signorelli, 2013. "Youth and total unemployment rate: the impact of policies and institutions," Rivista Internazionale di Scienze Sociali, Vita e Pensiero, Pubblicazioni dell'Universita' Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, vol. 121(1), pages 63-86.
    5. Amine Samir, 2016. "The Canadian Unemployment Insurance Generosity: Reflections from a Comparative Analysis," Comparative Economic Research, Sciendo, vol. 19(3), pages 133-145, September.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D31 - Microeconomics - - Distribution - - - Personal Income and Wealth Distribution
    • C41 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods: Special Topics - - - Duration Analysis; Optimal Timing Strategies
    • J65 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Unemployment Insurance; Severance Pay; Plant Closings
    • J64 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search
    • I38 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty - - - Government Programs; Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs

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