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Corporate Governance During the Covid-19 Pandemic

Author

Listed:
  • Maria Alina Caratas

    (The Bucharest University of Economic Studies)

  • Elena Cerasela Spatariu

    (“Ovidius†University of Constanta)

  • Raluca Andreea Trandafir

    (“Ovidius†University of Constanta)

Abstract

The purpose of this article is to present some of the challenges that companies faced during the Covid-19 pandemic and how corporate governance practices helped them or not in adapting to the new business environment. Boards of directors apply market defense tactics to avoid hostile bids. Various takeover defenses were shown for Standard & Poor top 500 companies in 2020 and a qualitative analysis was performed on these defense takeover tactics. This study contributes to present literature on market reactions to Covid-19 outbreak in terms of corporate governance responses and emphasize key guidelines of good practice in takeover defense.

Suggested Citation

  • Maria Alina Caratas & Elena Cerasela Spatariu & Raluca Andreea Trandafir, 2021. "Corporate Governance During the Covid-19 Pandemic," Ovidius University Annals, Economic Sciences Series, Ovidius University of Constantza, Faculty of Economic Sciences, vol. 0(2), pages 233-238, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:ovi:oviste:v:xxi:y:2021:i:2:p:233-238
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Malatesta, Paul H. & Walkling, Ralph A., 1988. "Poison pill securities : Stockholder wealth, profitability, and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1-2), pages 347-376, January.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    corporate governance; corporate citizenship; COVID-19; takeover defense;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
    • O16 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Financial Markets; Saving and Capital Investment; Corporate Finance and Governance

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