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Does protectionist anti-takeover legislation lead to managerial entrenchment?

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  • Frattaroli, Marc

Abstract

I study a protectionist anti-takeover law introduced in 2014 that covers a subset of all firms in the economy. The law decreased affected firms’ likelihood of becoming the target of a merger or acquisition and had a negative impact on shareholder value. There is no evidence that management of those firms subsequently altered firm policies in its interest. Investment, employment, wages, profitability, and capital structure remain unchanged. The share of annual CEO compensation consisting of equity instruments increased by 8.4 percentage points, suggesting that boards reacted to the loss in monitoring by the takeover market by increasing the pay-for-performance sensitivity.

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  • Frattaroli, Marc, 2020. "Does protectionist anti-takeover legislation lead to managerial entrenchment?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 136(1), pages 106-136.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jfinec:v:136:y:2020:i:1:p:106-136
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2019.03.014
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    2. Kim, Incheol & Lee, Suin & Sharma, Bina, 2023. "Competition law reform and firm performance: Evidence from developing countries," Emerging Markets Review, Elsevier, vol. 56(C).
    3. Sang Jun Cho & Chune Young Chung & Daniel Sungyeon Kim, 2023. "Do antitrust laws erode shareholder returns? Evidence from the Chinese market," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 55(2), pages 349-376, April.
    4. Chatjuthamard, Pattanaporn & Jiraporn, Pornsit & Lee, Sang Mook & Sarajoti, Pattarake, 2024. "Customer concentration, managerial risk aversion, and hostile takeover threats," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 95(C), pages 268-279.
    5. Eichenauer, Vera & Wang, Feicheng, 2024. "Mild deglobalization: Foreign investment screening and cross-border investment," Kiel Working Papers 2265, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Protectionism; Corporate governance; Mergers and acquisitions; Executive compensation; Free cash flow problem;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F52 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - National Security; Economic Nationalism
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
    • G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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