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Group Incentives for the Public Good: A Field Experiment on Improving the Urban Environment

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Listed:
  • Carol Newman
  • Tara Mitchell
  • Marcus Holmlund
  • Chloë Fernandez

Abstract

What strategies can help communities to overcome the public goods problem in the maintenance of communal spaces and infrastructure in urban environments? This paper investigates whether an intervention targeted at Community-Based Organizations can motivate them to make increased contributions to the public good, thereby improving outcomes for the community as a whole. Using a randomized controlled trial conducted in Dakar, Senegal, the analysis tests the effectiveness of a program that provides incentives to community groups to encourage them to keep their neighborhoods clean, with the ultimate goal of reducing flooding. After one year, the intervention proved to be effective in engaging communities, improving cleanliness, and reducing flooding.

Suggested Citation

  • Carol Newman & Tara Mitchell & Marcus Holmlund & Chloë Fernandez, 2024. "Group Incentives for the Public Good: A Field Experiment on Improving the Urban Environment," The World Bank Economic Review, World Bank, vol. 38(4), pages 824-845.
  • Handle: RePEc:oup:wbecrv:v:38:y:2024:i:4:p:824-845.
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/wber/lhae011
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    infrastructure; public goods; community-based organizations; flooding;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • O12 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Microeconomic Analyses of Economic Development
    • O13 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Agriculture; Natural Resources; Environment; Other Primary Products
    • O18 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Urban, Rural, Regional, and Transportation Analysis; Housing; Infrastructure

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