How Close Are Close Shareholder Votes?
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Cited by:
- Couzoff, Panagiotis & Banerjee, Shantanu & Pawlina, Grzegorz, 2022. "Effectiveness of monitoring, managerial entrenchment, and corporate cash holdings," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 77(C).
- Jiekun Huang, 2023. "Thy Neighbor’s Vote: Peer Effects in Proxy Voting," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 69(7), pages 4169-4189, July.
- Dasgupta, Amil & Fos, Vyacheslav & Sautner, Zacharias, 2021. "Institutional investors and corporate governance," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 112114, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Hshieh, Shenje & Li, Jiasun & Tang, Yingcong, 2021. "How do passive funds act as active owners? Evidence from mutual fund voting records," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 66(C).
- Cuñat, Vicente & Lu, Yiqing & Wu, Hong, 2021.
"Managerial response to shareholder empowerment: evidence from majority- voting legislation changes,"
LSE Research Online Documents on Economics
118896, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Cuñat, Vicente & Lu, Yiqing & Wu, Hong, 2023. "Managerial response to shareholder empowerment: evidence from majority-voting legislation changes," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 120742, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Laurent Bouton & Aniol Llorente-Saguer & Antonin Macé & Dimitrios Xefteris, 2021.
"Voting Rights, Agenda Control and Information Aggregation,"
NBER Working Papers
29005, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Laurent Bouton & Aniol Llorente-Saguer & Antonin Macé & Dimitrios Xefteris, 2024. "Voting Rights, Agenda Control and Information Aggregation," Working Papers halshs-03519689, HAL.
- Laurent Bouton & Aniol Llorente-Saguer & Antonin Macé & Dimitrios Xefteris, 2024. "Voting Rights, Agenda Control and Information Aggregation," PSE Working Papers halshs-03519689, HAL.
- Vicente Cuñat & Mireia Giné & Maria Guadalupe, 2020.
"Price and Probability: Decomposing the Takeover Effects of Anti‐Takeover Provisions,"
Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 75(5), pages 2591-2629, October.
- Guadalupe, Maria & Cuñat, Vicente & Gine, Mireia, 2017. "Price and Probability: Decomposing the Takeover Effects of Anti-Takeover Provisions," CEPR Discussion Papers 12059, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Cuñat, Vicente & Giné, Mireia & Guadalupe, Maria, 2020. "Price and probability: decomposing the takeover effects of anti-takeover provisions," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 101888, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- David, Thomas & Di Giuli, Alberta & Romec, Arthur, 2023. "CEO reputation and shareholder voting," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 83(C).
- Brav, Alon & Cain, Matthew & Zytnick, Jonathon, 2022. "Retail shareholder participation in the proxy process: Monitoring, engagement, and voting," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 144(2), pages 492-522.
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