Real Option Financing Under Asymmetric Information
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- Arve, Malin & Zwart, Gijsbert, 2023. "Optimal procurement and investment in new technologies under uncertainty," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 147(C).
- Alessandro Spiganti, 2022. "Wealth Inequality and the Exploration of Novel Alternatives," Working Papers 2022:02, Department of Economics, University of Venice "Ca' Foscari".
- Ni, Jian & Zhao, Jun & Chu, Lap Keung, 2021. "Supply contracting and process innovation in a dynamic supply chain with information asymmetry," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 288(2), pages 552-562.
- Gomes, Renato & Gottlieb, Daniel & Maestri, Lucas, 2016.
"Experimentation and project selection: Screening and learning,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 96(C), pages 145-169.
- Gomes, Renato & Gottlieb, Daniel & Maestri, Lucas, 2016. "Experimentation and project selection: screening and learning," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 102229, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Arnoud Boot & Vladimir Vladimirov, 2019.
"(Non-)Precautionary Cash Hoarding and the Evolution of Growth Firms,"
Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 65(11), pages 5290-5307, November.
- Boot, Arnoud & Vladimirov, Vladimir, 2016. "Non-Precautionary Cash Hoarding and the Evolution of Growth Firms," CEPR Discussion Papers 11510, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Keiichi Hori & Hiroshi Osano, 2017.
"Agency Contracts, Noncommitment Timing Strategies and Real Options,"
The Japanese Economic Review, Springer, vol. 68(4), pages 521-554, December.
- Keiichi Hori & Hiroshi Osano, 2017. "Agency Contracts, Noncommitment Timing Strategies and Real Options," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 68(4), pages 521-554, December.
- Keiichi Hori & Hiroshi Osano, 2011. "Agency Contracts, Noncommitment Timing Strategies, and Real Options," KIER Working Papers 768, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research.
- Catherine Bobtcheff & Raphaël Levy, 2017.
"More Haste, Less Speed? Signaling through Investment Timing,"
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 9(3), pages 148-186, August.
- Bobtcheff, Catherine & Levy, Raphaël, 2015. "More Haste, Less Speed? Signaling through Investment Timing," TSE Working Papers 15-571, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
- Qiuqi Wang & Yue Kuen Kwok, 2019. "Signaling game models of equity financing under information asymmetry and finite project life," International Journal of Financial Engineering (IJFE), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 6(01), pages 1-38, March.
- Miglo, Anton, 2022. "Theories of financing for entrepreneurial firms: a review," MPRA Paper 115835, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Zormpas, Dimitrios, 2020.
"Investments under vertical relations and agency conflicts: A real options approach,"
International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 70(C), pages 273-287.
- Dimitrios Zormpas, 2018. "Investments under vertical relations and agency conflicts: a real options approach," 2018 Papers pzo81, Job Market Papers.
- Hennessy, Christopher A. & Livdan, Dmitry, 2021. "Learning, parameter drift, and the credibility revolution," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 117(C), pages 395-417.
- Ni, Jian & Xu, Yue & Shi, Jia & Li, Jiali, 2024. "Product innovation in a supply chain with information asymmetry: Is more private information always worse?," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 314(1), pages 229-240.
- Alessandro Spiganti, 2020. "Can Starving Start‐ups Beat Fat Labs? A Bandit Model of Innovation with Endogenous Financing Constraint," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 122(2), pages 702-731, April.
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