IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/oup/revfin/v21y2017i4p1445-1484..html
   My bibliography  Save this article

The Revolving Door for Financial Regulators

Author

Listed:
  • Sophie A. Shive
  • Margaret M. Forster

Abstract

We investigate the motivations and effects of financial firms’ hiring of former US financial regulatory employees. The number of top executives with regulatory experience per firm has increased 24% over 2001–15, and hiring is associated with positive average announcement returns and a salary premium. In the quarter after hire, market and balance sheet measures of firm risk decrease significantly and measures of risk management activity increase, especially for hires from prudential regulators, who directly monitor financial firm risk. The absence of this result for unregulated firms and for exogenous shocks to regulatory experience suggests that firms hire ex-employees of their regulators when they perceive a need to reduce risk, consistent with a schooling hypothesis. We find little direct evidence of quid pro quo behavior in regulatory event frequency and fines.

Suggested Citation

  • Sophie A. Shive & Margaret M. Forster, 2017. "The Revolving Door for Financial Regulators," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 21(4), pages 1445-1484.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:revfin:v:21:y:2017:i:4:p:1445-1484.
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/rof/rfw035
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Acemoglu, Daron & Johnson, Simon & Kermani, Amir & Kwak, James & Mitton, Todd, 2016. "The value of connections in turbulent times: Evidence from the United States," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 121(2), pages 368-391.
    2. deHaan, Ed & Kedia, Simi & Koh, Kevin & Rajgopal, Shivaram, 2015. "The revolving door and the SEC’s enforcement outcomes: Initial evidence from civil litigation," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 65-96.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Kempf, Elisabeth, 2020. "The job rating game: Revolving doors and analyst incentives," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 135(1), pages 41-67.
    2. Ms. Deniz O Igan & Thomas Lambert, 2019. "Bank Lobbying: Regulatory Capture and Beyond," IMF Working Papers 2019/171, International Monetary Fund.
    3. Lim, Ivan & Hagendorff, Jens & Armitage, Seth, 2019. "Is the fox guarding the henhouse? Bankers in the Federal Reserve, bank leverage and risk-shifting," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 58(C), pages 478-504.
    4. de C. Griebeler, Marcelo & F. Damo, Alexandre, 2021. "Serving three masters: optimal monetary and regulatory policies when central bankers have career concerns," Revista Brasileira de Economia - RBE, EPGE Brazilian School of Economics and Finance - FGV EPGE (Brazil), vol. 75(3), December.
    5. Reint Gropp & Steven Ongena & Jörg Rocholl & Vahid Saadi, 2022. "The cleansing effect of banking crises," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 60(3), pages 1186-1213, July.
    6. Michelson, Noam, 2023. "The revolving door of former civil servants and firm value: A comprehensive approach," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 79(C).
    7. Luechinger, Simon & Moser, Christoph, 2020. "The European Commission and the revolving door," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 127(C).
    8. Charles-Cadogan, G., 2021. "Market Instability, Investor Sentiment, And Probability Judgment Error in Index Option Prices," CRETA Online Discussion Paper Series 71, Centre for Research in Economic Theory and its Applications CRETA.
    9. Wang, Ping & Wang, Xiaochun & Wu, Jie, 2023. "Executives' regulatory experiences and corporate social responsibility," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 55(PB).
    10. Thomas Schneider & Philip E Strahan & Jun Yang, 2023. "Bank Stress Testing: Public Interest or Regulatory Capture?," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 27(2), pages 423-467.
    11. Thomas Lambert, 2019. "Lobbying on Regulatory Enforcement Actions: Evidence from U.S. Commercial and Savings Banks," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 67(6), pages 2545-2572, June.
    12. Matteo Cotugno & Antonio D'Amato & Angela Gallo & Valeria Stefanelli, 2021. "Do supervisory enforcement actions affect board composition?," Corporate Governance: An International Review, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 29(1), pages 22-44, January.
    13. Antonín Korauš & Ján Dobrovič & Jozef Polák & Stanislav Backa, 2019. "Aspects of the security use of payment card pin code analysed by the methods of multidimensional statistics," Entrepreneurship and Sustainability Issues, VsI Entrepreneurship and Sustainability Center, vol. 6(4), pages 2017-2036, June.
    14. Thomas Ian Schneider & Philip E. Strahan & Jun Yang, 2020. "Bank Stress Testing: Public Interest or Regulatory Capture?," NBER Working Papers 26887, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    15. Prasanna Gai & Sherry X. Wu, 2023. "On Market‐Friendly Central Bankers," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 99(325), pages 238-252, June.
    16. Zhang, Karen & Truong, Cameron, 2019. "What’s the value of politically connected directors?," Journal of Contemporary Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(3).
    17. Jonas Heese, 2022. "Does Industry Employment of Active Regulators Weaken Oversight?," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 68(12), pages 9198-9218, December.
    18. Jan Libich & Liam Lenten, 2022. "Hero or villain? The financial system in the 21st century," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 36(1), pages 3-40, February.
    19. Claes Axel Belfrage & Markus Kallifatides, 2018. "The politicisation of macroprudential regulation: The critical Swedish case," Environment and Planning A, , vol. 50(3), pages 709-729, May.
    20. Gopalan, Yadav, 2022. "The effects of ratings disclosure by bank regulators," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 73(1).

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Asai, Kentaro & Kawai, Kei & Nakabayashi, Jun, 2021. "Regulatory capture in public procurement: Evidence from revolving door bureaucrats in Japan," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 186(C), pages 328-343.
    2. Ormazabal, Gaizka, 2018. "The Role of Stakeholders in Corporate Governance: A View from Accounting Research," CEPR Discussion Papers 12775, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    3. Luechinger, Simon & Moser, Christoph, 2020. "The European Commission and the revolving door," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 127(C).
    4. Echevarría, Cruz A. & Hasancebi, Serhat & García-Enríquez, Javier, 2022. "Economic Effects of Macao’s Integration with Mainland China: A Causal Inference Study," Journal of Economic Integration, Center for Economic Integration, Sejong University, vol. 37(2), pages 179-215.
    5. Bruno Ferman & Cristine Pinto & Vitor Possebom, 2020. "Cherry Picking with Synthetic Controls," Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 39(2), pages 510-532, March.
    6. Manuel Funke & Moritz Schularick & Christoph Trebesch, 2023. "Populist Leaders and the Economy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 113(12), pages 3249-3288, December.
    7. Vincenzo Galasso, 2020. "Market Reactions to Quest for Decentralization and Independence: Evidence from Catalonia," CESifo Working Paper Series 8254, CESifo.
    8. Kempf, Elisabeth, 2017. "The Job Rating Game: The Effects of Revolving Doors on Analyst Incentives," Working Papers 258, The University of Chicago Booth School of Business, George J. Stigler Center for the Study of the Economy and the State.
    9. Zhang, Bobo & Zhang, Zhou, 2022. "Shining light on corporate political spending: Evidence from shareholder engagements," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(C).
    10. Tarek A Hassan & Stephan Hollander & Laurence van Lent & Ahmed Tahoun, 2019. "Firm-Level Political Risk: Measurement and Effects," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 134(4), pages 2135-2202.
    11. Nikita Moiseev & Alexey Mikhaylov & Hasan Dinçer & Serhat Yüksel, 2023. "Market capitalization shock effects on open innovation models in e-commerce: golden cut q-rung orthopair fuzzy multicriteria decision-making analysis," Financial Innovation, Springer;Southwestern University of Finance and Economics, vol. 9(1), pages 1-25, December.
    12. Huang, Yi & Lin, Chen & Liu, Sibo & Tang, Heiwai, 2023. "Trade networks and firm value: Evidence from the U.S.-China trade war," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 145(C).
    13. Wang, Fengrong & Mbanyele, William & Muchenje, Linda, 2022. "Economic policy uncertainty and stock liquidity: The mitigating effect of information disclosure," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 59(C).
    14. Gilles Saint‐Paul & Davide Ticchi & Andrea Vindigni, 2021. "Engineering crises: Favoritism and strategic fiscal indiscipline," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 33(3), pages 583-610, November.
    15. Silvia Marchesi & Tania Masi, 2019. "Sovereign risk after sovereign restructuring. Private and official default," Working Papers 423, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised Nov 2019.
    16. Jin, Xuejun & Chen, Zhenhao & Luo, Deming, 2019. "Anti-corruption, political connections and corporate responses: Evidence from Chinese listed companies," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 57(C).
    17. Lychakov, Nikita, 2018. "Government-made bank distress: Industrialisation policies and the Russian financial crisis of 1899-1902," QUCEH Working Paper Series 2018-11, Queen's University Belfast, Queen's University Centre for Economic History.
    18. Barseghyan, Gayane, 2019. "Sanctions and counter-sanctions : What did they do?," BOFIT Discussion Papers 24/2019, Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition.
    19. Biguri, Kizkitza & Brownlees, Christian & Ippolito, Filippo, 2022. "Corporate hedging and the variance of stock returns," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 72(C).
    20. Adam Scavette, 2023. "The Impact of New Jersey's Urban Enterprise Zones on Local Employment: A Synthetic Control Approach," Economic Development Quarterly, , vol. 37(2), pages 127-142, May.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Financial regulation; Revolving door;

    JEL classification:

    • G18 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G23 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Non-bank Financial Institutions; Financial Instruments; Institutional Investors

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:oup:revfin:v:21:y:2017:i:4:p:1445-1484.. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Oxford University Press (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/eufaaea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.