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Lobbying and liquidity requirements: Large versus small banks

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  • Shy, Oz
  • Stenbacka, Rune

Abstract

We design a model with banks of unequal size operating subject to liquidity requirements in an imperfectly-competitive deposit market. We show that large banks have stronger incentives than small ones to lobby in order to relax the liquidity requirements unless they bear significantly higher lobbying costs. Therefore, lobbying magnifies asymmetries between banks. Furthermore, we establish that the organization of influence activities matters. An industry-wide bank association for lobbying to relax the liquidity requirements suffers from an internal conflict of interest and cannot simultaneously benefit both large and small banks if these have identical lobbying cost functions.

Suggested Citation

  • Shy, Oz & Stenbacka, Rune, 2024. "Lobbying and liquidity requirements: Large versus small banks," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 74(C).
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:finsta:v:74:y:2024:i:c:s1572308924001013
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jfs.2024.101316
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Bank competition; Bank lobbying; Deposit rates; Required liquid reserves; Bank associations;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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