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Optimal Leverage Ratio and Capital Requirements with Limited Regulatory Power

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  • Ho-Mou Wu
  • Yue Zhao

Abstract

This article discusses the optimal leverage ratio and capital requirements when asymmetric information exists between the bank and the regulator. We show that the optimal requirements take different forms in the short and long run. In either case, imposing the risk-weighted capital requirement without considering the incentives of the bank to misreport its risk profile is never optimal by itself. In the long run, the optimal requirements take the form of a leverage ratio requirement on top of the risk-weighted capital requirement. The add-on leverage ratio requirement, which serves as a compensation for the limited supervisory power of the regulators, should be set such that the risk-taking behavior of the bank is unchanged from the situation in which the regulator uses the risk-weighted capital requirement alone, and the misreporting incentive of the bank is eliminated by the add-on leverage ratio requirement.

Suggested Citation

  • Ho-Mou Wu & Yue Zhao, 2016. "Optimal Leverage Ratio and Capital Requirements with Limited Regulatory Power," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 20(6), pages 2125-2150.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:revfin:v:20:y:2016:i:6:p:2125-2150.
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/rof/rfv068
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Armour, John & Mayer, Colin & Polo, Andrea, 2017. "Regulatory Sanctions and Reputational Damage in Financial Markets," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 52(4), pages 1429-1448, August.
    2. repec:ces:ifodic:v:8:y:2010:i:2:p:14566986 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Francesco Vallascas & Jens Hagendorff, 2013. "The Risk Sensitivity of Capital Requirements: Evidence from an International Sample of Large Banks," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 17(6), pages 1947-1988.
    4. Edward Simpson Prescott, 2004. "Auditing and bank capital regulation," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, vol. 90(Fall), pages 47-63.
    5. Martin Hellwig, 2010. "Capital Regulation after the Crisis: Business as Usual?," ifo DICE Report, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 8(02), pages 40-46, July.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Müller, Carola, 2022. "Capital requirements, market structure, and heterogeneous banks," IWH Discussion Papers 15/2022, Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH).
    2. Norvald Instefjord & Hiroyuki Nakata, 2023. "Micro-Prudential Regulation and Loan Monitoring," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, vol. 63(3), pages 339-362, June.
    3. Renaud Beaupain & Yann Braouezec, 2022. "International banking regulation and Tier 1 capital ratios. On the robustness of the critical average risk weight framework," Working Papers 2022-ACF-06, IESEG School of Management.
    4. Tirupam Goel & Isha Agarwal, 2021. "Limits of stress-test based bank regulation," BIS Working Papers 953, Bank for International Settlements.
    5. Christian Hott, 2022. "Leverage and Risk Taking under Moral Hazard," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, vol. 61(2), pages 167-185, April.
    6. Douglas da Rosa München & Herbert Kimura, 2020. "Regulatory Banking Leverage: what do you know?," Working Papers Series 540, Central Bank of Brazil, Research Department.
    7. Agarwal, Isha & Goel, Tirupam, 2024. "Bank regulation and supervision: A symbiotic relationship," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 163(C).
    8. Gong, Yaxian & Wei, Xu, 2022. "Asset quality, financing structure, and bank regulations," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 80(C), pages 1061-1075.
    9. Balachandran, Balasingham & Williams, Barry, 2018. "Effective governance, financial markets, financial institutions & crises," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 50(C), pages 1-15.
    10. Berardi, Simone & Marcelletti, Alessandra, 2017. "Optimal Bank Capital Requirements: An Asymmetric Information Perspective," LEAP Working Papers 2017/2, Luiss Institute for European Analysis and Policy.
    11. Müller, Carola, 2018. "Basel III capital requirements and heterogeneous banks," IWH Discussion Papers 14/2018, Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH), revised 2018.
    12. Han, Ruoning & Muyeed, Ahadul Kabir, 2024. "Deposit competition and effectiveness of bank capital requirements," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 74(C).
    13. Beaupain, Renaud & Braouezec, Yann, 2024. "International banking regulation and Tier 1 capital ratios. On the robustness of the critical average risk weight framework," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 91(C).
    14. repec:ies:wpaper:f202211 is not listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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