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Agenda-Manipulation in Ranking

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  • Gregorio Curello
  • Ludvig Sinander

Abstract

We study the susceptibility of committee governance (e.g. by boards of directors), modelled as the collective determination of a ranking of a set of alternatives, to manipulation of the order in which pairs of alternatives are voted on—agenda-manipulation. We exhibit an agenda strategy called insertion sort that allows a self-interested committee chair with no knowledge of how votes will be cast to do as well as if she had complete knowledge. Strategies with this “regret-freeness” property are characterized by their efficiency, and by their avoidance of two intuitive errors. What distinguishes regret-free strategies from each other is how they prioritize among alternatives; insertion sort prioritizes lexicographically.

Suggested Citation

  • Gregorio Curello & Ludvig Sinander, 2023. "Agenda-Manipulation in Ranking," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 90(4), pages 1865-1892.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:restud:v:90:y:2023:i:4:p:1865-1892.
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/restud/rdac071
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    References listed on IDEAS

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