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Equilibrium in Justifiable Strategies: A Model of Reason-based Choice in Extensive-form Games

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  • Ran Spiegler

Abstract

I explore the idea that people care about the justifiability of their decisions in the context of two-person extensive games. Each player justifies his strategy s with a belief b of the opponent's strategy which is consistent with the play path and maximally plausible (according to some exogenous criterion). We say that s is justifiable if against the ex post criticism that some other strategy s′ outperforms s against b, the player can argue that playing s′ would have exposed him to similar criticism in the opposite direction. Under a simplicity-based plausibility criterion, this concept implies systematic departures from maximizing behaviour in familiar games. Copyright 2002, Wiley-Blackwell.

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  • Ran Spiegler, 2002. "Equilibrium in Justifiable Strategies: A Model of Reason-based Choice in Extensive-form Games," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 69(3), pages 691-706.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:restud:v:69:y:2002:i:3:p:691-706
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1111/1467-937X.00222
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Lombardi, Michele, 2009. "Reason-based choice correspondences," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 57(1), pages 58-66, January.
    2. Lombardi, Michele, 2009. "Reason-based choice correspondences," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 57(1), pages 58-66, January.
    3. Topi Miettinen, 2010. "History-dependent Reciprocity in Alternating Offer Bargaining," Finnish Economic Papers, Finnish Economic Association, vol. 23(1), pages 1-15, Spring.
    4. Spiegler, Ran, 2005. "Testing threats in repeated games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 121(2), pages 214-235, April.
    5. Yair Antler, 2015. "Two-Sided Matching with Endogenous Preferences," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 7(3), pages 241-258, August.
    6. Sascha Grehl & Andreas Tutić, 2015. "Experimental Evidence on Iterated Reasoning in Games," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 10(8), pages 1-19, August.
    7. Basov Suren & Danilkina Svetlana, 2007. "Auctions with Opportunistic Experts," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 7(1), pages 1-11, November.
    8. Spiegler, Ran, 2004. "Simplicity of beliefs and delay tactics in a concession game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 200-220, April.
    9. Cherepanov, Vadim & Feddersen, Timothy & ,, 2013. "Rationalization," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 8(3), September.
    10. Maenner, Eliot, 2008. "Adaptation and complexity in repeated games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 63(1), pages 166-187, May.
    11. Li, Duozhe, 2007. "Bargaining with history-dependent preferences," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 136(1), pages 695-708, September.
    12. Matthew G. Nagler, 2023. "Thoughts matter: a theory of motivated preference," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 94(2), pages 211-247, February.

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