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Do Nonfinancial Firms Use Financial Assets to Take Risk?

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Listed:
  • Zhiyao Chen
  • Ran Duchin

Abstract

Using hand-collected data on financial asset portfolios and exploiting the 2014 oil price crisis as an exogenous cash flow shock, we investigate financial risk-taking at distressed firms. We find that distressed firms, with high debt rollover risk proxied for by short-term liabilities, substantially increase their investments in risky financial assets, including corporate debt, equity, and mortgage-backed securities. The effects are stronger for unhedged firms with low collateral assets. Overall, we provide new evidence that distressed firms take risk using financial assets camouflaged as cash reserves, which, compared to real assets, are less visible and carry lower transaction costs and accelerated payoffs. (JEL G32, G34)

Suggested Citation

  • Zhiyao Chen & Ran Duchin, 2024. "Do Nonfinancial Firms Use Financial Assets to Take Risk?," The Review of Corporate Finance Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 13(1), pages 1-37.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:rcorpf:v:13:y:2024:i:1:p:1-37.
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/rcfs/cfac040
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance

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