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Governors and Partisan Polarization in the Federal Arena

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  • Jennifer M. Jensen

Abstract

Governors have always had to balance state interests with political party interests. However, governors’ role in the federal arena, which historically has had a significant bipartisan element, has shifted somewhat, today placing a greater emphasis on party interests. This change is one of the degree; it is less a sea change than a change in the salinity of the sea. I provide evidence of this move to more partisan behavior and explore two sets of interrelated factors that have influenced this change: party polarization in Congress and state legislatures and among voters, and the structure, activities and influence of the National Governors Association, Democratic Governors Association, and Republican Governors Association. This article represents an initial effort to tease out some of the varied causal effects and establish a framework for scholars to further explore the dual gubernatorial responsibilities of advancing state interests and party interests.

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  • Jennifer M. Jensen, 2017. "Governors and Partisan Polarization in the Federal Arena," Publius: The Journal of Federalism, CSF Associates Inc., vol. 47(3), pages 314-341.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:publus:v:47:y:2017:i:3:p:314-341.
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/publius/pjx035
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    1. Timothy J. Conlan & Paul L. Posner, 2016. "American Federalism in an Era of Partisan Polarization: The Intergovernmental Paradox of Obama’s "New Nationalism"," Publius: The Journal of Federalism, CSF Associates Inc., vol. 46(3), pages 281-307.
    2. Bednar,Jenna, 2009. "The Robust Federation," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521703963, October.
    3. Bednar,Jenna, 2009. "The Robust Federation," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521878999, October.
    4. Elizabeth Rigby & Jake Haselswerdt, 2013. "Hybrid Federalism, Partisan Politics, and Early Implementation of State Health Insurance Exchanges," Publius: The Journal of Federalism, CSF Associates Inc., vol. 43(3), pages 368-391, July.
    5. James H. Read, 2016. "Constitutionalizing the Dispute: Federalism in Hyper-Partisan Times," Publius: The Journal of Federalism, CSF Associates Inc., vol. 46(3), pages 337-365.
    6. J. Mitchell Pickerill & Cynthia J. Bowling, 2014. "Polarized Parties, Politics, and Policies: Fragmented Federalism in 2013–2014," Publius: The Journal of Federalism, CSF Associates Inc., vol. 44(3), pages 369-398.
    7. Nolan McCarty & Keith T. Poole & Howard Rosenthal, 2009. "Does Gerrymandering Cause Polarization?," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 53(3), pages 666-680, July.
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    Cited by:

    1. Murray, Gregg R. & Murray, Susan M., 2020. "Following Doctors’ Advice: Explaining the Issuance of Stay-at-Home Orders Related to the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) by U.S. Governors," OSF Preprints 92ay6, Center for Open Science.
    2. Jessica Weinkle, 2022. "An evaluation of North Carolina science advice on COVID-19 pandemic response," Palgrave Communications, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 9(1), pages 1-16, December.

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