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Federalism and the Electoral College: The Development of the General Ticket Method for Selecting Presidential Electors

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  • Robert E. Ross

Abstract

This article contributes to our understanding of the development of the federal aspect of the Electoral College by analyzing how and why states adopted the general ticket method currently used by all but two states. I examine early state experimentation with methods of choosing presidential electors, at a time when several prominent founders viewed the district system as the most principled method. I also focus on developments after the 1824 election, when Congress rejected a constitutional amendment requiring states to adopt the district system and the general ticket system grew in popularity. I show that it was in the course of these debates in the 1820s that the general ticket system acquired a new principled defense: that it best represented state majorities in the presidential selection process. This analysis enhances our understanding of one of the political safeguards of federalism, by explaining the entrenchment of state authority over the mode of choosing electors as well as adoption and justification of the general ticket system.

Suggested Citation

  • Robert E. Ross, 2016. "Federalism and the Electoral College: The Development of the General Ticket Method for Selecting Presidential Electors," Publius: The Journal of Federalism, CSF Associates Inc., vol. 46(2), pages 147-169.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:publus:v:46:y:2016:i:2:p:147-169.
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/publius/pjv043
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    1. Bednar,Jenna, 2009. "The Robust Federation," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521703963, October.
    2. Bednar,Jenna, 2009. "The Robust Federation," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521878999, October.
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    Cited by:

    1. Rami Zeedan, 2019. "The 2016 US Presidential Elections: What Went Wrong in Pre-Election Polls? Demographics Help to Explain," J, MDPI, vol. 2(1), pages 1-18, March.

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