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Uncertainty and the Choice of Protective Instrument

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  • Falvey, Rodney E
  • Lloyd, P J

Abstract

This paper examines the problem of how governments choose among trade-policy instruments under uncertainty. Policymakers are assumed to select the level and form of protection so as to maximize a political support function whose arguments are the utilities of individual producers, consumers, and rent recipients. The characteristics of the optimal protective instrument are then derived for different sources of uncertainty. The model is also used to make second-best rankings between tariff and quota instruments that depend upon the source of uncertainty and other parameters. Copyright 1991 by Royal Economic Society.

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  • Falvey, Rodney E & Lloyd, P J, 1991. "Uncertainty and the Choice of Protective Instrument," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 43(3), pages 463-478, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:oxecpp:v:43:y:1991:i:3:p:463-78
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    Cited by:

    1. Francois, Joseph F. & Martin, Will, 2004. "Commercial policy variability, bindings, and market access," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 48(3), pages 665-679, June.
    2. Nuno Limão & Patricia Tovar, 2018. "Policy choice: Theory and evidence from commitment via international trade agreements," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Policy Externalities and International Trade Agreements, chapter 6, pages 179-198, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    3. Donald MacLaren, 2016. "The Contingent Tariff of the Special Safeguard Mechanism: What Happens When Markets are Imperfectly Competitive?," Journal of Agricultural Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 67(1), pages 62-83, February.
    4. Simon P. Anderson & Nicolas Schmitt, 2003. "Nontariff Barriers and Trade Liberalization," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 41(1), pages 80-97, January.
    5. Donald MacLaren, 2014. "The Special Safeguard Mechanism (SSM) and Tariffs: Price Behaviour with Imperfectly Competitive Market Intermediaries," CESifo Working Paper Series 4585, CESifo.
    6. Swinnen, Johan F.M., 1997. "The Political Economy of Agricultural Transition," 1997: Economic Transition in Central and East Europe, and the Former Soviet Union: Implications ... Symposium, June 12-14, 1997, Berlin, Germany 50836, International Agricultural Trade Research Consortium.
    7. kishore gawande & pravin krishna, 2005. "The Political Economy of Trade Policy: Empirical Approaches," International Trade 0503003, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    8. Gervais Jean-Philippe & Harvey E. Lapan, 2002. "Endogenous Choice of Trade Instrument Under Uncertainty," International Economic Journal, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 16(4), pages 75-96.
    9. Gervais, Jean-Philippe, 1999. "Optimal trade policy, time consistency and uncertainty in an oligopsonistic world market," ISU General Staff Papers 1999010108000013564, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.

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