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The Nature of Rational Choice and The Foundations of Statistics

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  • Anand, Paul

Abstract

This paper addresses the claim that L. J. Savage's account of subjective utility theory models beliefs for all rational agents. Proposals for a two-dimensional model of belief are discussed and sources of criticism of subjective utility theory as a theory of rational choice are categorized. A theory of rational choice is proposed that gives conditions under which choices (including those made by "uncertainty" averters) can be judged to be rational. The paper corroborates A. K. Sen's findings, which show that rationality is not a behavioral entity. Copyright 1991 by Royal Economic Society.

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  • Anand, Paul, 1991. "The Nature of Rational Choice and The Foundations of Statistics," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 43(2), pages 199-216, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:oxecpp:v:43:y:1991:i:2:p:199-216
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    Cited by:

    1. Feduzi, Alberto, 2007. "On the relationship between Keynes's conception of evidential weight and the Ellsberg paradox," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 28(5), pages 545-565, October.
    2. Marcello Basili & Carlo Zappia, 2007. "The weight of argument and non-additive measures: a note," Department of Economic Policy, Finance and Development (DEPFID) University of Siena 003, Department of Economic Policy, Finance and Development (DEPFID), University of Siena.
    3. Basili, Marcello & Zappia, Carlo, 2009. "Keynes's "non-numerical" probabilities and non-additive measures," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 30(3), pages 419-430, June.
    4. Anand, Paul, 2001. "Procedural fairness in economic and social choice: Evidence from a survey of voters," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 247-270, April.
    5. Marcello Basili & Carlo Zappia, 2010. "Ambiguity and uncertainty in Ellsberg and Shackle," Cambridge Journal of Economics, Cambridge Political Economy Society, vol. 34(3), pages 449-474.
    6. Alberto Feduzi, 2010. "On Keynes's conception of the Weight of Evidence," Post-Print hal-00870185, HAL.
    7. Feduzi, Alberto, 2010. "On Keynes's conception of the weight of evidence," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 338-351, November.

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