IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/oup/ooecxx/v1y2022ip1-16..html
   My bibliography  Save this article

The existential trilemma of EMU in a model of fiscal target zone

Author

Listed:
  • Pompeo Della Posta
  • Roberto Tamborini

Abstract

Objectives: Is the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) truly ‘irreversible’ as stated in the treaties? (i) From the sovereign debt crises of the 2010s, and the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, we draw the lesson that when exposed to large, systemic shocks the EMU faces a trilemma among preserving its irreversibility, monetary orthodoxy and fiscal orthodoxy: irreversibility can only be saved by relaxing one of the twin orthodoxies or both. (ii) We show how central monetary/fiscal backstops to irreversibility can be designed in a consistent manner that minimises their amplitude and mitigates the moral hazard concerns.Methods: We present a novel fiscal target zone model of the EMU, where public debt is hit by stochastic shocks and member governments under monetary and fiscal orthodoxy are willing to abide by their commitment to debt stability only up to an upper bound of their feasible fiscal effort. Shocks large enough push the stabilisation fiscal effort beyond the feasibility constraint, in which case a government would opt for default on debt service and breakup of EMU membership—similarly to the abandonment of an exchange-rate agreement. Results: For the EMU to be truly irreversible, ramparts for extraordinary times are necessary beside regulations for ordinary times. The alternative to these devices is reformulating the treaties with explicit and regulated exit procedures.

Suggested Citation

  • Pompeo Della Posta & Roberto Tamborini, 2022. "The existential trilemma of EMU in a model of fiscal target zone," Oxford Open Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 1, pages 1-16.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:ooecxx:v:1:y:2022:i::p:1-16.
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/ooec/odac002
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Enrico Spolaore, 2013. "What Is European Integration Really About? A Political Guide for Economists," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 27(3), pages 125-144, Summer.
    2. Giancarlo Corsetti & Barry Eichengreen & Galina Hale & Eric Tallman, 2020. "The Euro Crisis in the Mirror of the EMS: How Tying Odysseus to the Mast Avoided the Sirens but Led Him to Charybdis," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 31(2), pages 219-236, April.
    3. Athanassiou, Phoebus, 2009. "Withdrawal and expulsion from the EU and EMU: some reflections," Legal Working Paper Series 10, European Central Bank.
    4. Markus K. Brunnermeier & Harold James & Jean-Pierre Landau, 2016. "The Euro and the Battle of Ideas," Economics Books, Princeton University Press, edition 1, number 10828.
    5. Furceri, Davide & Zdzienicka, Aleksandra, 2012. "How costly are debt crises?," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 31(4), pages 726-742.
    6. Roberto Tamborini, 2014. "Interest-Rate Spread and Public-Debt Dynamics in a Two-Country Monetary-Union Portfolio Model," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 25(2), pages 243-261, April.
    7. Roel Beetsma & Massimo Giuliodori, 2010. "The Macroeconomic Costs and Benefits of the EMU and Other Monetary Unions: An Overview of Recent Research," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 48(3), pages 603-641, September.
    8. Carlo Favero & Alessandro Missale, 2011. "Sovereign spreads in the Euro Area. Which prospects for a Eurobond?," Working Papers 424, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
    9. Miguel A. Segoviano & Carlos Caceres & Vincenzo Guzzo, 2010. "Sovereign Spreads: Global Risk Aversion, Contagion or Fundamentals?," IMF Working Papers 2010/120, International Monetary Fund.
    10. Krugman,Paul & Miller,Marcus (ed.), 1992. "Exchange Rate Targets and Currency Bands," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521435260, October.
    11. Philip R. Lane, 2021. "The Resilience of the Euro," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 35(2), pages 3-22, Spring.
    12. Katia Berti & Francisco de Castro & Matteo Salto, 2013. "Effects of fiscal consolidation envisaged in the 2013 Stability and Convergence Programmes on public debt dynamics in EU Member States," European Economy - Economic Papers 2008 - 2015 504, Directorate General Economic and Financial Affairs (DG ECFIN), European Commission.
    13. Paul Krugman & Marcus Miller, 1992. "Exchange Rate Targets and Currency Bands," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number krug92-1.
    14. Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-491, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Julia del Amo Valor & Marcos Martín Mateos & Diego Martínez López & Javier J. Pérez, 2023. "Is the European economic governance framework too “complex”? A critical discussion," Working Papers 2023-06, FEDEA.
    2. Pompeo Della Posta & Roberto Tamborini, 2022. "The Eurozone as an inflation target zone," DEM Working Papers 2022/7, Department of Economics and Management.
    3. Della Posta, Pompeo & Tamborini, Roberto, 2023. "Does an inflation target zone help or hinder price stability?," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 129(C).

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Pompeo Della Posta & Roberto Tamborini, 2021. "The Existential Trilemma of EMU in a Model of Fiscal Target Zone," EconPol Working Paper 66, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich.
    2. Newby, Elisa, 2012. "The suspension of the gold standard as sustainable monetary policy," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 36(10), pages 1498-1519.
    3. Roberto Tamborini, 2013. "The new fiscal rules for the EMU. Threats from heterogeneity and interdependence," European Journal of Comparative Economics, Cattaneo University (LIUC), vol. 10(3), pages 415-436, December.
    4. Philip R. Lane, 2021. "The Resilience of the Euro," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 35(2), pages 3-22, Spring.
    5. Andreozzi, Luciano & Tamborini, Roberto, 2019. "Models of supranational policymaking and the reform of the EMU," Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, vol. 41(5), pages 819-844.
    6. Barry Eichengreen., 1993. "International Monetary Arrangements for the 21st Century," Center for International and Development Economics Research (CIDER) Working Papers C93-021, University of California at Berkeley.
    7. Ozkan, F. Gulcin & Sutherland, Alan, 1998. "A currency crisis model with an optimising policymaker," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 339-364, April.
    8. Nicola Acocella, "undated". "The theoretical roots of EMU institutions and policies during the crisis," Working Papers 126/14, Sapienza University of Rome, Metodi e Modelli per l'Economia, il Territorio e la Finanza MEMOTEF.
    9. Miller, Marcus & Zhang, Lei, 1996. "Optimal target zones: How an exchange rate mechanism can improve upon discretion," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 20(9-10), pages 1641-1660.
    10. John Muellbauer, 2013. "Conditional eurobonds and the eurozone sovereign debt crisis," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press and Oxford Review of Economic Policy Limited, vol. 29(3), pages 610-645, AUTUMN.
    11. Frank A.G. den Butter & Mathieu L.L. Segers, 2014. "Prospects for an EMU between Federalism and Nationalism," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 14-008/VI, Tinbergen Institute.
    12. Mark Trede & Bernd Wilfling, 2007. "Estimating exchange rate dynamics with diffusion processes: an application to Greek EMU data," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 33(1), pages 23-39, July.
    13. Afonso, António & Arghyrou, Michael G. & Bagdatoglou, George & Kontonikas, Alexandros, 2015. "On the time-varying relationship between EMU sovereign spreads and their determinants," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 44(C), pages 363-371.
    14. Koedijk, Kees G. & Mizrach, Bruce & Stork, Philip A. & de Vries, Casper G., 1995. "New evidence on the effectiveness of foreign exchange market intervention," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 39(3-4), pages 501-508, April.
    15. Lewis, Karen K, 1996. "Stochastic Regime Switching and Stabilizing Policies within Regimes," International Journal of Finance & Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 1(2), pages 71-85, April.
    16. Mateusz Szczurek, 2006. "Exchange Rate Regimes and Nominal Convergence," Springer Books, in: Marek Dabrowski & Jacek Rostowski (ed.), The Eastern Enlargement of the Eurozone, chapter 0, pages 91-111, Springer.
    17. Jean-Sébastien Pentecôte & Marc-Alexandre Sénégas, 2003. "Comment fixer les cours de change?. Annonces et correspondances maastrichtiennes," Recherches économiques de Louvain, De Boeck Université, vol. 69(1), pages 39-71.
    18. repec:cnb:ocpubv:as16 is not listed on IDEAS
    19. Aleberto Alesina & Guido Tabellini & Francesco Trebbi, 2017. "Is Europe an Optimal Political Area?," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 48(1 (Spring), pages 169-234.
    20. Roberto Tamborini, 2017. "Europe at the Interdependence War," EconPol Working Paper 2, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich.
    21. Milind M. Shrikhande, 1997. "The cost of doing business abroad and international capital market equilibrium," FRB Atlanta Working Paper 97-3, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:oup:ooecxx:v:1:y:2022:i::p:1-16.. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Oxford University Press (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://academic.oup.com/ooec .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.