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The Ownership of Data

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  • Anastasios Dosis
  • Wilfried Sand-Zantman

Abstract

We study the effects of property rights over the use of data on market outcomes. To do so, we consider a model in which a monopolistic firm offers a service to a set of heterogeneous users. The use of the service generates valuable data, but data monetization entails a privacy cost for users. A trade-off emerges between under-processing and over-monetization of data. We show that both the firm and users prefer the users (the firm) to own the rights for low (high) values of data. We further discuss the robustness of our results when allowing more possible contracts for the data owner and show that the main trade-off is robust to these extensions.

Suggested Citation

  • Anastasios Dosis & Wilfried Sand-Zantman, 2023. "The Ownership of Data," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 39(3), pages 615-641.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:39:y:2023:i:3:p:615-641.
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Sarit Markovich & Yaron Yehezkel, 2021. "“For the public benefit”: who should control our data?," Working Papers 21-08, NET Institute.
    2. Charles I. Jones & Christopher Tonetti, 2020. "Nonrivalry and the Economics of Data," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 110(9), pages 2819-2858, September.
    3. DELBONO Flavio & REGGIANI Carlo & SANDRINI Luca, 2021. "Strategic data sales to competing firms," JRC Working Papers on Digital Economy 2021-05, Joint Research Centre.
    4. de Cornière, Alexandre & Taylor, Greg, 2022. "Data and Competition: a Simple Framework with Applications to Mergers and Market Structure," CEPR Discussion Papers 14446, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    5. de Cornière, Alexandre & Taylor, Greg, 2020. "Data and Competition: a General Framework with Applications to Mergers, Market Structure, and Privacy Policy," TSE Working Papers 20-1076, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
    6. Yiquan Gu & Leonardo Madio & Carlo Reggiani, 2019. "Exclusive Data, Price Manipulation and Market Leadership," CESifo Working Paper Series 7853, CESifo.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
    • K11 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Property Law
    • L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies

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