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The Failure Of Competitive Entry Into Fixed-Line Telecommunications: Who Is At Fault?

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  • Robert W. Crandall
  • Leonard Waverman

Abstract

Between 1998 and 2003, dozens of companies entered newly liberalized telecommunications markets in OECD countries. In Europe and North America, most of the entrants that attempted to use incumbents' “unbundled local loops,” at regulated wholesale prices, to offer narrowband services—essentially “plain old telephone service”—have failed. Even though Europe, the United States and Canada liberalized at different times and with somewhat different policies, excessive entry occurred in each region with too many players chasing an illusive pot of revenue with poorly designed business plans. On the other hand, the use of unbundled or shared local loops for entry into broadband services may be more of a winning strategy because it allows the entrant to compete for customers by offering new services. This appears to be the emerging broadband strategy in Europe of large ISPs owned by incumbent telecommunication companies in other countries (for example, France Telecom's Wanadoo) and in Japan. However, such entry has not worked in the United States, where new companies, such as Covad, have failed to develop profitable operations.

Suggested Citation

  • Robert W. Crandall & Leonard Waverman, 2006. "The Failure Of Competitive Entry Into Fixed-Line Telecommunications: Who Is At Fault?," Journal of Competition Law and Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 2(1), pages 113-148.
  • Handle: RePEc:oup:jcomle:v:2:y:2006:i:1:p:113-148.
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/joclec/nhl001
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    Cited by:

    1. Grajek, Michał & Röller, Lars-Hendrik, 2009. "Regulation and investment in network industries: Evidence from European telecoms," SFB 649 Discussion Papers 2009-039, Humboldt University Berlin, Collaborative Research Center 649: Economic Risk.
    2. Foros, Øystein & Kind, Hans Jarle & Sand, Jan Yngve, 2009. "Entry may increase network providers' profit," Telecommunications Policy, Elsevier, vol. 33(9), pages 486-494, October.
    3. Michał Grajek & Lars-Hendrik Röller, 2012. "Regulation and Investment in Network Industries: Evidence from European Telecoms," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 55(1), pages 189-216.
    4. Dogan, Pinar & Bourreau, Marc & Manant, Matthieu, 2010. "A Critical Review of the “Ladder of Investment†Approach," Scholarly Articles 4777447, Harvard Kennedy School of Government.

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