Decision and coordination of low-carbon supply chain under the trend of new retailing[Game theoretical perspectives on dual-channel supply chain competition with price discounts and pricing schemes]

Considering the supply chains consisting of a single manufacturer, a single new retailer and a traditional retailer and assuming that demands were affected by the manufacturer’s reduction of carbon emission, the new retailer’s service and the traditional retailer’s promotion, new retailing channel preference coefficient is defined and the supply chain decision models under different contract mechanisms are developed. The inference of how the manufacturer improves reduction of carbon emission, how the new retailer improves service and how the traditional retailer improves promotion through effective coordination mechanism is analyzed. The research results show that the cost sharing will make supply chain have a Pareto improvement to a considerable degree. The greater the marginal profit of the supplier is, the worse the coordination effect of the cooperative emission reduction mode will be. The comparative advantage of the cooperative service coordination and cooperative promotion coordination depends on the influence of service and promotion on channel demand. The greater the impact of reduction of carbon emission on channel demand is, the higher its rate should be shared by the channel retailer. The profit of supply chain is positively related to a new retailing channel preference; this indicates that opening up the ‘new retailing’ is beneficial for improving supply chain profits.