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Pledge-and-Review Bargaining: from Kyoto to Paris

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  • Bård Harstad

Abstract

A tractable dynamic model of international climate policies is analysed. The choice of bargaining game influences participation levels, emission quotas and technology investment levels. I derive several predictions that are arguably consistent with the differences between the 1997 Kyoto Protocol and the 2015 Paris Agreement—including the transitioning from the former to the latter.

Suggested Citation

  • Bård Harstad, 2023. "Pledge-and-Review Bargaining: from Kyoto to Paris," The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 133(651), pages 1181-1216.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:econjl:v:133:y:2023:i:651:p:1181-1216.
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/ej/ueac076
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. David Martimort & Wilfried Sand-Zantman, 2016. "A Mechanism Design Approach To Climate-Change Agreements," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 14(3), pages 669-718, June.
    2. Miguel Borrero & Santiago J. Rubio, 2022. "An adaptation-mitigation game: does adaptation promote participation in international environmental agreements?," International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 22(3), pages 439-479, September.
    3. Calvo, Emilio & Rubio, Santiago J., 2013. "Dynamic Models of International Environmental Agreements: A Differential Game Approach," International Review of Environmental and Resource Economics, now publishers, vol. 6(4), pages 289-339, April.
    4. Léonard,Daniel & Long,Ngo van, 1992. "Optimal Control Theory and Static Optimization in Economics," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521331586, January.
    5. Kováč, Eugen & Schmidt, Robert C., 2021. "A simple dynamic climate cooperation model," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 194(C).
    6. Gilligan, Michael J., 2004. "Is There a Broader-Deeper Trade-off in International Multilateral Agreements?," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 58(3), pages 459-484, July.
    7. Robert Falkner & Hannes Stephan & John Vogler, 2010. "International climate policy after Copenhagen: towards a �building blocks� approach," GRI Working Papers 21, Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment.
    8. Scott Barrett & Astrid Dannenberg, 2016. "An experimental investigation into ‘pledge and review’ in climate negotiations," Climatic Change, Springer, vol. 138(1), pages 339-351, September.
    9. William Nordhaus, 2015. "Climate Clubs: Overcoming Free-Riding in International Climate Policy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 105(4), pages 1339-1370, April.
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    Cited by:

    1. Goeschl, Timo & Soldà, Alice, 2024. "(Un)Trustworthy pledges and cooperation in social dilemmas," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 223(C), pages 106-119.
    2. Eichner, Thomas & Schopf, Mark, 2024. "On breadth and depth of climate agreements with pledge-and-review bargaining," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 125(C).
    3. Wu, Shu & Hu, Fangfang & Zhang, Zhijian, 2024. "Visible hand or invisible hand in climate governance? Evidence from China," Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, Elsevier, vol. 204(C).
    4. Christoph Böhringer & Carsten Helm & Laura Schürer, 2023. "How to Boost Countries’ Climate Ambitions: Turning Gains from Emissions Trading into Gains for Climate," CESifo Working Paper Series 10624, CESifo.

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