The Self-serving Bias and Beliefs about Rationality
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Cited by:
- Lackner, Mario & Sonnabend, Hendrik, 2021.
"Coping with advantageous inequity—Field evidence from professional penalty kicking,"
Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 91(C).
- Mario Lackner & Hendrik Sonnabend, 2017. "Coping with advantageous inequity - Field evidence from professional penalty kicking," Economics working papers 2017-21, Department of Economics, Johannes Kepler University Linz, Austria.
- Otto, Philipp E. & Bolle, Friedel, 2015. "Exploiting one’s power with a guilty conscience: An experimental investigation of self-serving biases," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 51(C), pages 79-89.
- Muren, Astri, 2004. "Unrealistic Optimism about Exogenous Events: An Experimental Test," Research Papers in Economics 2004:1, Stockholm University, Department of Economics.
- Marco Bertini & Daniel Halbheer & Oded Koenigsberg, 2012.
"Self-Serving Behavior in Price-Quality Competition,"
Working Papers
hal-01993405, HAL.
- Marco Bertini & Daniel Halbheer & Oded Koenigsberg, 2013. "Self-Serving Behavior in Price-Quality Competition," Working Papers 334, University of Zurich, Department of Business Administration (IBW).
- Halbheer, Daniel & Bertini, Marco & Koenigsberg, Oded, 2013. "Self-Serving Behavior in Price-Quality Competition," VfS Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order 79842, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
- Asheim, Geir B. & Helland, Leif & Hovi, Jon & Hoyland, Bjorn, 2008. "Self-serving Dictators," Memorandum 26/2008, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
- Lia Q. Flores & Miguel A. Fonseca, 2021.
"Do in-group biases lead to overconfidence in performance? Experimental evidence,"
Discussion Papers
2103, University of Exeter, Department of Economics.
- Lia Q. Flores & Miguel A. Fonseca, 2022. "Do in-group biases lead to overconfidence in performance? Experimental evidence," CEF.UP Working Papers 2202, Universidade do Porto, Faculdade de Economia do Porto.
- Astri Muren, 2012. "Optimistic Behavior When A Decision Bias Is Costly: An Experimental Test," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 50(2), pages 463-469, April.
- Choo, Lawrence & Kaplan, Todd R. & Zhou, Xiaoyu, 2019. "Can auctions select people by their level-k types?," MPRA Paper 95987, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Alan Schwartz, 2008. "How Much Irrationality Does the Market Permit?," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 37(1), pages 131-159, January.
- Alewell, Dorothea & Nicklisch, Andreas, 2009. "Wage differentials and social comparison: An experimental study of interrelated ultimatum bargaining," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(3), pages 210-220, September.
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JEL classification:
- C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
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